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Synallagma as a Paradigm of Exchange: Reciprocity of Contract in Aristotle and Game Theory

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Aristotle and The Philosophy of Law: Theory, Practice and Justice

Part of the book series: Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice ((IUSGENT,volume 23))

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Abstract

The meaning of reciprocity and fairness within contracts seems to be a constant source of disagreement and a continuous subject of ongoing theoretical debates in legal and moral philosophy. It is especially discernible within a mainstream of the classical post-Aristotelian tradition. The problem seems to pertain to the interdependence between the two parties of contract and their respective obligations. Mutual interdependence of contractual or pre-contractual obligations is usually indentified with a Greek term συνάλλαγμα, playing a significant role in Aristotelian philosophy, especially in theory of justice. Such interdependence has so far been analysed within a context of Pythagorean mathematics and has eventually been modelled in game theory. Game theoretic models such as Nash solution to bargaining problem are based on the assumption that contract consist in strategic interaction between agents. The paper explores the interactions between Aristotelian theory of commutative justice and contemporary advances in game theory and philosophy of contracts, aiming at addressing the question whether the Aristotelian concept of synallagma could still be regarded as a central category of contract law.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For discussion about the Aristotelian concept of justice in contracts cf: Gordley (1981, 1587), Gordley (2001, 297–326), Murphy (2002, 85), Atiyah (1985, 1), Golecki (2008, 26–111 and 266–288).

  2. 2.

    The significance of this distinction for contract law has been emphasized in Gordley (1981, 1588–1592).

  3. 3.

    An example may serve the rule that two thirds of the profit should belong to this partner who had given two thirds of the original capital for a given enterprise. See Lowry (1969, 47–49).

  4. 4.

    Within this context Aristotle used the example of exchange between a house-builder and a shoe-maker. (EN V. 5.1133 a 10–15 and EN V.5.1133 b 1).

  5. 5.

    Cf. Aristotle plainly distinguishes between corrective and commutative justice, admitting that: “Some hold that the reciprocity is just without qualification. This was the claim of the Pythagoreans, since they defined, without qualification, what is just as reciprocity with another. Reciprocity however fits neither distributive nor rectificatory justice, since often they conflict. (…) Again voluntariness and involuntariness make great difference” (EN V.5. 1133 a 1–10, trans. R. Crisp).

  6. 6.

    In classical comment on the function of commutative justice in Nicomachean Ethics, D. G. Ritchie endorses that: “It seems to me quite certain that Corrective Justice is intended to apply to voluntary contracts, only when the terms of the contract have not been fulfilled.” Ritchie (1894, 188).

  7. 7.

    These reflections were later applied within the scholastic debates concerning the notion of a “fair price”. See Lowry (1969, 49).

  8. 8.

    It is not certain whether it was Aristotle himself or the work of the later commentators who had attached a diagram of the “figure of exchange” to the text. See: Lowry (1969, 57–58).

  9. 9.

    The connection between Aristotelian theory of justice and development of economic theory of value has widely been discussed in literature. See: Worland (1984, 107–112), Langholm (1979, 164), Tieben (2009, 3–11).

  10. 10.

    See Soudek (1952, 66–72).

  11. 11.

    Moreover, K. Polanyi points out that the mechanisms of supply and demand, which are acting within the sphere of free-market, and which are the subject of analysis of the neoclassical theory of economics, were not known to Aristotle; see Polanyi (1957, 64–94).

  12. 12.

    W. D. Ross in his classical work on Aristotle states however, that: “There is no moral virtue in commercial justice as described by Aristotle.Justice” here is not a virtue, but a sort ofgovernor” in the economic machine which keeps exchange prices from swinging far from the actual value, for human needs, of the goods exchanged”. Ross (1953, 213).

  13. 13.

    Within this context one can underline an interesting remark of J.N. Keynes. While dealing with the scope of methodology of economic sciences. He stressed the existence of an intermediate sphere between the science of political economics and the area of applied economics, which subject is situated not only within the economic perspective but also the moral dimension of economic activity of the society. Cf. Keynes (1955, 61–63).

  14. 14.

    As far as the notion of “market society” is concerned, see: Polanyi (1944, 23–45).

  15. 15.

    The relationship between synallagma and legal regulations of contract and tort in Ancient Greece has been widely discussed. See: Lee (1937, 131), Hamburger (1951, 39–65), Maffi (1980, 17).

  16. 16.

    EN 1131 a 2–3. The distinction has been widely discussed in literature. See: Jackson (1879, 76), Gauthier and Jolif (1958, 391).

  17. 17.

    D. G. Ritchie states that: “It seems to me quite certain that Corrective Justice is intended to apply to voluntary contracts, only when the terms of the contract have not been fulfilled” Ritchie (1894, p. 188).

  18. 18.

    EN 1135 b 5–10.

  19. 19.

    This point has been raised by many authors, including: del Vecchio (1956, 60–65), Finnis (1980, 177–184), Gordley (1981, 1604–1606).

  20. 20.

    Cf. a critique of Aristotelian concept of commutative justice presented by A. W. R. Harrison who states that: “The precise interpretation of Aristotle’s mathematical scheme here is notoriously difficult and I do not pretend to understand it fully.” Harrison (1957, 45); M. Wesoły endorses that: “(…) his conception of rectificatory justice seems to be somewhat strange and unsatisfactory”; cf. Wesoły (1989, 217–218). Similarly Hardie (1968, 191–192), del Vecchio (1956, 52–56) and Kelsen (1957, 135–136).

  21. 21.

    For the application of this game to the solution of bargaining problem with reference to the Aristotelian theory of justice cf. Binmore (2005, 105).

  22. 22.

    The same model of Rubinstein bargaining game has been implemented to solve the bargaining problem in Peenvyhouse v. Garland. Cf. Baird et al. (1995, 224–241).

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Correspondence to Mariusz Jerzy Golecki .

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Golecki, M.J. (2013). Synallagma as a Paradigm of Exchange: Reciprocity of Contract in Aristotle and Game Theory. In: Huppes-Cluysenaer, L., Coelho, N. (eds) Aristotle and The Philosophy of Law: Theory, Practice and Justice. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 23. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6031-8_14

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