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The Verification of the Peaceful Nature of Iran’s Nuclear Program

  • Olli Heinonen
Chapter

Abstract

This chapter reviews the history of defiance of Iran to heed to the requests of the international community to clarify the scope and nature of Iran’s nuclear program. Since it became public in 2002–2003 that Iran had violated its safeguards obligations and was building an enrichment plant in Natanz and a 40 MWt heavy-water reactor at Arak, the EU3 (France, Germany and the United Kingdom) embarked on a diplomatic process to stop Iran from moving closer to a nuclear weapons capability. The process negotiation process was replaced by the efforts of P5+1 (EU3 plus China, Russia, USA) during which the case was deferred from the IAEA to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). In spite of several UNSC resolutions, and increasing sanctions and diplomatic efforts, Iran has not agreed to the verification requests. The paper describes technical measures on how Iran can restore, through the IAEA verification process, the peaceful nature of its nuclear program. The article proposes an alternative path: the policy of openness and cooperation, which will bring about the transparency that is required about the scope and content of Iran’s nuclear program. By selecting this path, Iran can demonstrate that it follows the spirit of the NPT, fulfills its legal obligations, and can without ambiguities enjoy its legitimate rights under the Treaty.

Keywords

Security Council Nuclear Material Enrich Uranium Additional Protocol United Nations Security Council 
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References

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Belfer Center for Science and International AffairsHarvard UniversityCambridgeUSA

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