Abstract
This chapter reviews the history of defiance of Iran to heed to the requests of the international community to clarify the scope and nature of Iran’s nuclear program. Since it became public in 2002–2003 that Iran had violated its safeguards obligations and was building an enrichment plant in Natanz and a 40 MWt heavy-water reactor at Arak, the EU3 (France, Germany and the United Kingdom) embarked on a diplomatic process to stop Iran from moving closer to a nuclear weapons capability. The process negotiation process was replaced by the efforts of P5+1 (EU3 plus China, Russia, USA) during which the case was deferred from the IAEA to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). In spite of several UNSC resolutions, and increasing sanctions and diplomatic efforts, Iran has not agreed to the verification requests. The paper describes technical measures on how Iran can restore, through the IAEA verification process, the peaceful nature of its nuclear program. The article proposes an alternative path: the policy of openness and cooperation, which will bring about the transparency that is required about the scope and content of Iran’s nuclear program. By selecting this path, Iran can demonstrate that it follows the spirit of the NPT, fulfills its legal obligations, and can without ambiguities enjoy its legitimate rights under the Treaty.
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France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.
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The United Nations Security Council has adopted the following resolutions on Iran: 1696 (2006); 1737 (2006); 1747 (2007); 1803 (2008); 1835 (2008); and 1929 (2010).
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Code 3.1. refers to the provision of design information for the facilities. In 1992 the IAEA Board of Governors decided on safeguards strengthening measures. The new Code 3.1., adopted in 1992, stipulates that first design information is to be provided as soon as a decision on the construction of a facility is made. Iran is the only country with a substantial nuclear program, which does not apply the new code.
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In 2005, United States, Russia, and China joined the EU3 efforts.
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Under the provisions of a safeguards agreement, a State can request exemption of nuclear material up to certain limits. However, if the material is stored or mixed with safeguarded material, or processed further, safeguards needs to be re-applied to the material.
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In early 1990s, during the IAEA Board discussions on strengthening of the IAEA safeguards, then Director General Hans Blix advocated voluntary ‘transparency visits’ to clarify questions and ambiguities that were raised by the international community.
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Press Release 92/11, 14 February 1992, IAEA.
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In 2009 Iran requested the IAEA assistance to have 20% enriched fuel for the TRR. Russia, US, and France negotiated an agreement in Iran would have exported most of its stockpile of 3.5% LEU (800 kg) as feed to produce 120 kg of 20% enriched uranium for TRR fuel. This would have been sufficient to run the TRR for more than a decade. However, Iran did not signal its final agreement to the deal. Finally, in May 2010, Turkey and Brazil persuaded Iran to agree to a new version of the deal under which Iran’s LEU would be held in Turkey until the TRR fuel was delivered. This deal was, however, too little and too late. Meanwhile, the stocks of 3.5% enriched uranium had substantially increased. Additionally, as the deal was agreed to on the eve of a new sanctions vote by the UN Security Council, the US rejected the agreement as a tactical move by Iran to derail the sanctions vote.
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Interview of Mr. Abbasi Davani, Al-Alam News Network, 19 February 2012.
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Recently Mr. F. Abbasi Davani, the Head of the AEOI offered of 5 years of transparency measures to the IAEA, which included the Additional Protocol, Code 3.1, and other measures in exchange for the UNSC Sanctions being removed.
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Reprocessing and plutonium recycle are not currently economic.
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Heinonen, O. (2013). The Verification of the Peaceful Nature of Iran’s Nuclear Program. In: Kang, J. (eds) Assessment of the Nuclear Programs of Iran and North Korea. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6019-6_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6019-6_7
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