Retaliation in the Crito

Abstract

Socrates has two major lines of argument in the Crito, concerning a possible escape: that retaliation is wrong (and that by escaping he would be retaliating against Athens for its judgment at his trial) and that he has a legitimate agreement with Athens that he will abide by its laws and judgments (and that escaping would be violating that agreement.) The second of those arguments has received the major attention in comments on the Crito,. But the retaliation topic, though significantly overlooked, is equally important and equally connected to Athenian thought in the fifth century. I argue here that Socrates attempts two distinct arguments to show that, contrary to orthodox Athenian public opinion, retaliation is wrong. However, upon critical examination—in which the bulk of the essay consists—both of those arguments fail. The consequence is that one half of Socrates’ case for not escaping cannot stand.

While David Keyt was not able to render me more than an amateur in Greek philosophy, he has shaped my philosophical practice so deeply that, no matter what topic I write about, his footprints are all over the result.