What Is Visual and Phenomenal but Concerns Neither Hue Nor Shade?

  • Pete MandikEmail author
Part of the Studies in Brain and Mind book series (SIBM, volume 6)


Though the following problem is not explicitly raised by her, it seems sufficiently similar to an issue of pertinence to Akins’s “Black and White and Color” (Akins 2014) to merit the moniker, Akinss Problem: Can there be a visual experience devoid of both color phenomenology and black-and-white phenomenology?


Visual Experience Conscious Experience Phenomenal Character Conscious State Luminance Contrast 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.



Most of what I know about the neurophilosophy of color I learned while under the influence of Kathleen Akins and Martin Hahn, and I am grateful for conversations with them about this stuff over the years. Thanks are due as well for conversations on related matters with Richard Brown, Jacob Berger, and David Rosenthal.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyWilliam Paterson University of New JerseyWayneUSA

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