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But Where Is a Hallucinator’s Perceptual Justification?

  • Heather Logue
Chapter
Part of the Studies in Brain and Mind book series (SIBM, volume 6)

Abstract

Sam sees a tomato on the table before her, and sees its redness. Call this situation ‘the good case’. In virtue of seeing the tomato and its redness, Sam is justified in believing that there is a red tomato before her—at least, that’s what we ordinarily think. However, it is possible for Sam to have a subjectively indistinguishable experience in which she sees a tomato, but doesn’t see its color (e.g., an illusory experience in which the subject sees a white tomato bathed in red light), or in which she doesn’t see anything in her environment at all (e.g., a total hallucination “as of” a red tomato). Call these situations ‘the bad cases’. In light of such possibilities, it’s hard to resist the conclusion that Sam’s good case experience bestows no more justification on the claim that there is a red tomato before her than it does on (e.g.) the claim that there is a white tomato bathed in red light before her. So how can Sam’s belief that there is a red tomato before her be perceptually justified? (As is well known, a structurally similar problem can be raised about whether Sam’s perceptually-based belief amounts to knowledge.)

Keywords

Perceptual Experience Case Experience Rational Psychology Perceptual Justification Epistemological Disjunctivism 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Philosophy, Religion, and History of ScienceUniversity of LeedsLeedsUK

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