Participation in Public Debate and Ethical Division Within Nations

  • Emmanuel Picavet


This contribution is an analysis of the circumstances of the debate about justice. The furtherance of particular claims or interests in public debate is crucially dependent upon contingent circumstances. Building on insights from collective action theory, the theory of normative dynamics and constitutional analyses of the nature of argument, it is argued that, when compared with more liberal values, less liberal values face more difficult argumentative contexts in a seemingly neutral liberal framework. Correcting for such a bias is identified as a normative issue.


Public Good Collective Action Public Debate Liberal Democracy Private Interest 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.UFR 10Université Paris I Panthéon-SorbonneParisFrance

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