Neoliberalism and Authority Relationships

  • Emmanuel Picavet


In this contribution, evolving authority relationships between institutions are examined in connection with interpretative tasks. In recent decades, the interpretation of several general economic and political principles has been impacted by the influence of (mainstream) neoliberal ideas. This is illustrated by the changing frontiers of national and community action domains in the European Union. This case study raises a number of theoretical issues; the proposed developments, it is argued, have added value for explanatory purposes.


Good Governance Institutional Actor French Government Legitimate Power Successful Coordination 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.UFR 10, Université Paris I Panthéon-SorbonneParisFrance

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