Reflective Knowledge and the Pyrrhonian Problematic

  • John Greco
Part of the Philosophical Studies Series book series (PSSP, volume 119)


Section 1 of this chapter reviews the Pyrrhonian problematic, characterized as a multistage dialectic that begins with Agrippa’s Trilemma concerning a regress of reasons and ends with a version of the problem of the criterion. Section 2 reviews Sosa’s two-tier epistemology, giving special attention to (a) Sosa’s characteristic distinction between animal and reflective knowledge, (b) the value of reflective knowledge over mere animal knowledge, and (c) relations among human knowledge, animal knowledge, and reflective knowledge. Section 3 considers Sosa’s treatment of the Pyrrhonian problematic and the role of reflective knowledge in his solution to it. Section 4 offers an evaluation.


Human Knowledge Epistemic Justification Animal Knowledge Reflective Knowledge Philosophical Understanding 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophySaint Louis UniversitySt. LouisUSA

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