Virtue, Intuition, and Philosophical Methodology
This chapter considers Ernest Sosa’s contributions to philosophical methodology. In Sect. 1, Sosa’s approach to the role of intuitions in the epistemology of philosophy is considered and related to his broader virtue-theoretic epistemological framework. Of particular focus is the question whether false or unjustified intuitions may justify. Section 2 considers Sosa’s response to skeptical challenges about intuitions, especially those deriving from experimental philosophy. I argue that Sosa’s attempt to attribute apparent disagreement in survey data to difference in meaning fails, but that some of his other, more general, responses to experimentalist skeptics succeed.
KeywordsPerceptual Experience Justify Belief Epistemic Justification Perceptual Model Gettier Case
Thanks to Carrie Ichikawa Jenkins, Ernest Sosa, and John Turri for helpful comments.
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