Virtue, Intuition, and Philosophical Methodology

Chapter
Part of the Philosophical Studies Series book series (PSSP, volume 119)

Abstract

This chapter considers Ernest Sosa’s contributions to philosophical methodology. In Sect. 1, Sosa’s approach to the role of intuitions in the epistemology of philosophy is considered and related to his broader virtue-theoretic epistemological framework. Of particular focus is the question whether false or unjustified intuitions may justify. Section 2 considers Sosa’s response to skeptical challenges about intuitions, especially those deriving from experimental philosophy. I argue that Sosa’s attempt to attribute apparent disagreement in survey data to difference in meaning fails, but that some of his other, more general, responses to experimentalist skeptics succeed.

Keywords

Perceptual Experience Justify Belief Epistemic Justification Perceptual Model Gettier Case 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgments 

Thanks to Carrie Ichikawa Jenkins, Ernest Sosa, and John Turri for helpful comments.

Bibliography

  1. Bealer, G. 1992. The Incoherence of empiricism. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 66: 99–138.Google Scholar
  2. Bealer, G. 1998. Intuition and the autonomy of philosophy. In Rethinking intuition: The psychology of intuition and its role in philosophical inquiry, ed. Michael DePaul and William Ramsey, 201–239. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield.Google Scholar
  3. Burge, T. 1979. Individualism and the mental. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4: 73–121.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Chalmers, D. 2011. Verbal disputes. Philosophical Review 120(4): 515–566.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Conee, E., and R. Feldman. 1998. The generality problem for reliabilism. Philosophical Studies 89(1): 1–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Cummins, R. 1998. Reflection on reflective equilibrium. In Rethinking intuition, ed. Michael R. DePaul and William Ramsey, 113–127. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.Google Scholar
  7. Ichikawa, J.J. 2011. Experimentalist pressure against traditional methodology. Philosophical Psychology 25(5): 743–765.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Ichikawa, J.J. 2014. Who needs intuitions? Two experimentalist critiques. In Intuitions, eds. T. Booth and D. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  9. Ludwig, K. 2007. The epistemology of thought experiments: First person versus third person approaches. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31: 128–159.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. McBeath, K., D. Shaffer, and M. Kaiser. 1995. How baseball outfielders determine where to run to catch fly balls. Science 28(268): 569–573.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Nozick, R. 1981. Philosophical explanations. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  12. Sosa, Ernest. 1998. Minimal intuition. In Rethinking intuition, ed. Michael R. DePaul and William Ramsey, 257–270. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.Google Scholar
  13. Sosa, E. 2007a. A virtue epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Sosa, E. 2007b. Intuitions: Their nature and epistemic efficacy. Grazer Philosophische Studien 74(1): 51–67.Google Scholar
  15. Sosa, E. 2007c. Experimental philosophy and philosophical intuition. Philosophical Studies 132(1): 99–107.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Sosa, E. 2009. A defense of the use of intuitions in philosophy. In Stich and his critics, ed. D. Murphy and M. Bishop. Chichester/Malden: Blackwell.Google Scholar
  17. Sosa, E. 2010a. Intuitions and meaning divergence. Philosophical Psychology 23(4): 419–426.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Sosa, E. 2010b. Value matters in epistemology. Journal of Philosophy 107(4): 167–190.Google Scholar
  19. Stich, S. 1993. The fragmentation of reason. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  20. Stich, S. 2009. Replies to critics. In Stich and his critics, ed. D. Murphy and M. Bishop. Chichester/Malden: Blackwell.Google Scholar
  21. Swain, S., J. Alexander, and J. Weinberg. 2008. The instability of philosophical intuitions: Running hot and cold on truetemp. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76(1): 138–155.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. Tversky, A., and D. Kahneman. 1974. Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science 185(4157): 1124–1131.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Weinberg, J. 2007. How to challenge intuitions without risking skepticism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31: 318–343.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. Weinberg, J., S. Nichols, and S. Stich. 2001. Normativity and epistemic intuitions. Philosophical Topics 29(1–2): 429–460.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of British ColumbiaVancouverCanada

Personalised recommendations