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Detecting Return Oriented Programming by Examining Positions of Saved Return Addresses

  • Jae-Won Min
  • Sung-Min Jung
  • Tai-Myoung Chung
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Electrical Engineering book series (LNEE, volume 214)

Abstract

In the recent years, return-oriented programming (ROP) has become the most widely used exploitation technique, achieving arbitrary code execution without injecting any code at all. This is possible by executing small sequences of assembly instructions found in binaries, also known as gadgets. Gadgets cannot do complex operations by themselves but when chained together, they can do any arbitrary operations theoretically. There were many mitigations proposed in the past but they either introduced large overhead or were too complex. In this paper, we propose a simple method of detecting ROP attacks by calculating distance between saved return addresses in the runtime stack. Examined ROP exploits which were published on the Internet resulted short distances between return addresses, which are gadget addresses, compared to that of normal control flow of the program. Our method can be used as a stand-alone tool or part of sequential checks in existing tools.

Keywords

Return oriented programming Code reuse attack Detection 

Notes

Acknowledgments

This work was supported by the IT R&D program of MKE/KEIT. [KI001810039260, Integrated dev-environment for personal, biz-customized open mobile cloud service and Collaboration tech for heterogeneous devices on server].

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Electrical and Computer EngineeringSungkyunkwan UniversitySuwonKorea
  2. 2.College of Information and Communication EngineeringSungkyunkwan UniversitySuwonKorea

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