Abstract
Preventing global warming is a public good requiring overall cooperation. Contributions will depend on the risk of future losses, which plays a key role in decision-making. Here, we discuss a theoretical model grounded on game theory and large-scale population dynamics. We show how decisions within small groups under high risk and stringent requirements toward success significantly raise the chances of coordinating to save the planet’s climate, thus escaping the tragedy of the commons. In addition, our model predicts that, if one takes into consideration that groups of different sizes will be interwoven in complex networks of contacts, the chances for global coordination into an overall cooperating state are further enhanced.
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- 1.
See (Barrett 2005, 2007).
- 2.
See (Hardin 1968).
- 3.
See (Milinski et al. 2008, 2011).
- 4.
E.g., see Alvard, Boesch, Creel, Stander and others.
- 5.
For details, see (Santos and Pacheco, 2011).
- 6.
For details, see (Santos and Pacheco, 2011).
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Santos, F.C., Pacheco, J.M. (2013). Behavioral Dynamics under Climate Change Dilemmas. In: Andersen, H., Dieks, D., Gonzalez, W., Uebel, T., Wheeler, G. (eds) New Challenges to Philosophy of Science. The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective, vol 4. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5845-2_10
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