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From Sharing a Background to Sharing One’s Presence

Two Conditions of Joint Attention
  • Ulla Schmid
Chapter
Part of the Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality book series (SIPS, volume 1)

Abstract

Joint attention is mainly investigated in empirical psychology, especially in the contexts of research into autism, social cognition, and the development of moral behavior. Philosophically, joint attention is supposed to clarify human cognitive abilities, the structure of the mind, and the origins of communication, cooperation, and moral evaluation. This chapter discusses the philosophical side of joint attention, focusing on the aspect of “jointness” in collective intentionality.

Throughout the debate concerning the role of joint attention in collective intentionality, jointness has been located in a relational structure holding among the participants of a collective action. But although there is considerable agreement that collective intentions are not entirely reducible to individual intentional states, the basis for this irreducibility remains a contentious issue. In this chapter, I treat joint attention as a core element of collective intentionality in general, arguing for a variety of the relational view. I argue that joint attention is omnipresent in everyday social interaction: subjects focus together on an object that attracts their common interest. When we jointly attend to an object, we share in what we focus on, but also in the evaluative mode in which we approach the object.

Keywords

Joint Attention Representational Content Simulation Theory Intentional Attitude Joint Engagement 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophisches SeminarUniversität BaselBaselSwitzerland

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