Trying to Act Together

The Structure and Role of Trust in Joint Action
  • Hans Bernhard Schmid
Part of the Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality book series (SIPS, volume 1)


When people act jointly, their mind is usually on their shared goal rather than on each other. It seems clear, however, that any intention to participate in a shared intentional activity involves some “background sense” of the other participants as participating, or intending to participate. This chapter addresses the question of the nature and kind of the attitude in question. It is argued against a number of received accounts that it is a special kind of interpersonal trust that combines cognitive and normative elements in a particular way.


Joint Action Normative Reason Normative Expectation Interpersonal Trust Normativist View 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institut für PhilosophieUniversität WienWienAustria

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