The Berlin Group and the Vienna Circle: Affinities and Divergences

  • Nikolay MilkovEmail author
Part of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science book series (BSPS, volume 273)


The Vienna Circle and the Berlin Group were schools of scientific philosophy that fought a common enemy—philosophical idealism and philosophical traditionalism in general. Their historically decisive influence makes it all the more disappointing that their intertwined story has not come down to us with due regard to its complexity. For the received account—that the Vienna Circle directed the scientific philosophy of the 1920s and 1930s—perpetuates an oversimplified picture of a seminal development of twentieth-century Western intellectual history. The fact is that the Berlin Group was an equal partner with the Vienna Circle, albeit one that pursued an itinerary of its own. But while the latter presented its defining projects in readily discernible terms and became immediately popular, the Berlin Group, whose project was at least as significant as that of its Austrian counterpart, remained largely unrecognized. The task of this chapter is to distinguish the Berliners’ work from that of the Vienna Circle and to bring to light its impact in the history of scientific philosophy.


Logical Analysis Analytic Philosophy Philosophical Logic Logical Positivist Logical Empiricism 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of PaderbornPaderbornGermany

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