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Climate Change and the Law pp 143–164Cite as

Analyzing Soft Law and Hard Law in Climate Change

Part of the Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice book series (IUSGENT,volume 21)

Abstract

There is a great deal of variety in the international environmental agreements that have mushroomed in past decades. These legal arrangements can be placed on a continuum from hard law – precise and legally binding treaties that oblige a behavioural change with delegated enforcement bodies – to the softest of soft law, with its vague, aspirational goals and no delegation or institutional follow-up. The legalization continuum is a more insightful starting point for analyzing international agreements than ‘bottom-up’ vs. ‘top-down’ or ‘pledge-and-review’ vs. ‘targets-and-timetables’ that are often suggested by reports and policy papers. When applying the legalization lenses to the UN climate regime, two big trends emerge. There is a notable turn toward soft law in developed country commitments in climate mitigation. In the meantime, the UN regime is becoming harder by providing greater transparency of climate actions of all major economies.

Keywords

  • Climate Regime
  • Global Governance
  • International Environmental Agreement
  • Legal Characteristic
  • Global Environmental Governance

These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Antto Vihma has completed his Ph.D. in the University of Helsinki, Faculty of Social Sciences, analyzing effectiveness and legitimacy of international agreements. He currently works as a Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs.

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Fig. 7.1

Notes

  1. 1.

    Kenneth Abbott et al., “The Concept of Legalization”, 54 International Organization (2000), 401.

  2. 2.

    Abram Chayes and Antonia H. Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements (London: Harvard University Press, 1995); John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, Global Business Regulation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

  3. 3.

    Xinuan Dai, International Institutions and National Policies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), at 7.

  4. 4.

    See for example Braithwaite and Drahos, Global Business Regulation, supra, note 2; Dinah Shelton (ed), Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-binding Norms in the International Legal System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), Steve Bernstein and Benjamin Cashore, “Can Non-State Global Governance be Legitimate? An Analytical Framework”, 1 Regulation & Governance (2007), 347; Julia Black, “Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and Accountability in Polycentric Regulatory Regimes”, 2 Regulation & Governance (2008), 137.

  5. 5.

    This grouping is by no means exhaustive list of perspectives that legal scholars use in studying international cooperation as a whole. Many other schools of thought and theoretical debates exist and are influenced by other disciplines such as anthropology, sociology, political philosophy and history.

  6. 6.

    Several analysts such as Shaffer and Pollack would call these critics of soft law “legal positivists”. However, some notable critical scholars such as Koskenniemi do not sit well with legal positivism, as he constantly emphasizes that his goal is not to promote positivist formalism, which could mask or neutralize political choices and conflicts. For this reason I adopt the term “critical formalism” to describe these viewpoints. See Gregory Shaffer and Mark Pollack, “Hard Law vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements and Antagonists in International Governance”, 94 Minnesota Law Review (2010), 706.

  7. 7.

    See seminal articles by Abbott et al., “Concept of Legalization”, supra, note 1; Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal, “Hard and Soft Law in International Governance”, 54 International Organization (2000), 421.

  8. 8.

    Abbott et al., “The Concept of Legalization”, supra, note 1.

  9. 9.

    Jacob Werksman and Kirk Herbertson, “The Aftermath of Copenhagen: Does International Law have a Role to Play in a Global Response to Climate Change?”, 25 Maryland Journal of International Law (2010), 109; Farhana Yamin and Joanna Depledge, The International Climate Change Regime: A Guide to Rules, Institutions and Procedures (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

  10. 10.

    The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Vienna, 22 March 1985, in force 22 September 1988, 26 International Legal Materials (1986), 1529.

  11. 11.

    The Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, in force 29 December 1993, 31 International Legal Materials (1992), 818.

  12. 12.

    The Framework Convention on Climate Change, Rio de Janeiro, 9 May 1992, in force 21 March 1993, 31 International Legal Materials (1992), 849.

  13. 13.

    For example the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP), see Harro Van Asselt, “From UN-ity to diversity? The UNFCCC, the Asia-Pacific Partnership, and the Future of International Law on Climate Change”, 1 Carbon and Climate Law Review (2007), 17; Sylvia Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and Harro Van Asselt, “Introduction: Exploring and Explaining the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate”, 9 International Environmental Agreements (2009), 195.

  14. 14.

    For example the Major Economies Forum/Meeting on Energy Security and Climate (MEF), several G8 and G20 meetings, and numerous regional forums, see Antto Vihma, “Friendly Neighbor or Trojan Horse? Assessing the Interaction of Soft Law Initiatives and the UN Climate Regime”, 9 International Environmental Agreements (2009), 239.

  15. 15.

    The Marrakesh Accords operationalized some of the key aspects of the Kyoto Protocol after long – lasting negotiations in 2001, related to, for example, reporting, verification and compliance. See Decisions 2-14/CP.7, The Marrakesh Accords, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1, 21 January 2002.

    For a recent discussion on the properties of COP decisions, see for example Antto Vihma, “A Climate of Consensus: The UNFCCC Faces Challenges of Effectiveness and Legitimacy”, 75 Finnish Institute of International Affairs Briefing Papers (2011).

  16. 16.

    For example Rene-Jean Dupuy, “Declaratory Law and Programmatory Law: From Revolutionary Custom to ‘Soft Law’” in Robert Akkerman et al. Declarations on Principles: A Quest for Universal Peace (Leiden: Sijthoff, 1977), 247.

  17. 17.

    Christine Chinkin, “The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law”, 38 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1989), 850.

  18. 18.

    Jan Klabbers, “Reflections on Soft International Law in a Privatized World”, XVI Finnish Yearbook of International Law (2007), 313, at paragraph II.

  19. 19.

    Dinah Shelton, “Introduction: Law, Non-law and the Problem of ‘Soft Law’”, in Shelton (ed.) Commitment and Compliance, supra, note 4.

  20. 20.

    Jonathan L. Charney, “Commentary: Compliance with International Soft Law” in Shelton (ed.), Commitment and Compliance, supra, note 4, at 115.

  21. 21.

    Shelton, “Introduction”, supra, note 18; Wolfgang Reinicke and Jan Martin Witte, “Interdependence, Globalization, and Sovereignty: The Role of Non-binding International Legal Accords”, in Shelton (ed.), Commitment and Compliance, supra, note 4.

  22. 22.

    Chinkin also includes an unnamed category in her study, which encompasses the norms that are developed without the involvement of states. Some scholars would not include these in the term soft law, while others consider such private regulation as a central part of international soft law. The realm of “private” soft law – which in itself can range from very precise, elaborate and enforced rules to vague principles or codes of conduct – is not addressed here. See Christine Chinkin, “Normative Development in the International Legal System” in Shelton (ed), Commitment and Compliance, supra, note 4, at 27.

  23. 23.

    See Charles Lipson, “Why are Some International Agreements Informal?”, 45 International Organization (1991); Abbott et al., “The Concept of Legalization”, supra, note 1; Abbott and Snidal, “Hard and Soft Law”, supra, note 6; Kal Raustiala, “Form and Substance in International Agreements”, 99 American Journal of International Law (2005); Shaffer and Pollack, “Hard Law vs. Soft Law”, supra, note 5.

  24. 24.

    Chinkin, “Normative Development”, supra, note 22.

  25. 25.

    David Trubek, Patrick Cotrell and Mark Nance, “soft Law, Hard Law, and EU Integration” in Joanne Scott and Gráinne de Búrca (eds), New Governance and Constitutionalism in Europe and the US (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006).

  26. 26.

    Peter Goodrich, “Law-Induced Anxiety: Legalists, Anti-Lawyers and the Boredom of Legality”, 9 Social & Legal Studies (2000), at 150.

  27. 27.

    Abbott et al., “The Concept of Legalization”, supra, note 1; Abbott and Snidal, “Hard and Soft Law”, supra, note 7.

  28. 28.

    Abbott et al., “The Concept of Legalization”, supra, note 1, at 401.

  29. 29.

    Jan Klabbers, “The Redundancy of Soft Law”, 65 Nordic Journal of International Law (1996), 167.

  30. 30.

    See Jan Klabbers, “The Undesirability of Soft Law”, 67 Nordic Journal of International Law (1998), 381. The normative argument is centred on the notion that increasing reliance on soft law represents a shift of power from legal institutions to “administrative power” in the EU context, namely to the European Commission.

  31. 31.

    Richard Bilder, “Beyond Compliance: Helping Nations Cooperate”, in Shelton (ed.), Commitment and Compliance, supra, note 4.

  32. 32.

    John Kirton and Michael Trebilcock, “Introduction: Hard Choices and Soft Law in Sustainable Global Governance” in John Kirton and Michael Trebilcock (eds), Hard Choices, Soft Law: Voluntary Standards in Global Trade, Environment and Social Governance (Cornwall: Ashgate, 2004), 3.

  33. 33.

    Shaffer and Pollack, “Hard Law vs. Soft Law”, supra, note 5.

  34. 34.

    Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and Vihma, “Comparing the Legitimacy and Effectiveness”, supra, note 34, at 401.

  35. 35.

    I would like to thank Professor Timo Koivurova for emphasizing this point in our correspondence.

  36. 36.

    Mary Jane Angelo et al., Reclaiming Global Environmental Leadership: Why the United States Should Ratify Ten Pending Environmental Treaties, Center for Progressive Reform White Paper #1201 (2012), available at: http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/International_Environmental_Treaties_1201.pdf (last accessed on 23 February 2012).

  37. 37.

    Helmut Breitmeier, Oran Young and Michael Zürn, Analyzing International Environmental Regimes: from Case Study to Database (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006).

  38. 38.

    Abbott and Snidal, “Hard and Soft Law”, supra, note 6.

  39. 39.

    Lipson, “Why are Some International Agreements Informal?”, supra, note 23; Abbott and Snidal, “Hard and Soft Law”, supra, note 7; Kirton and Trebilcock, “Introduction: Hard Choices and Soft Law”, supra, note 32; Shaffer and Pollack, “Hard Law vs. Soft Law”, supra, note 6.

  40. 40.

    See for example Vihma, “Friendly Neighbor or Trojan Horse?”, supra, note 144, at 250.

  41. 41.

    Chayes and Chayes, The New Sovereignty, supra, note 2.

  42. 42.

    Harold Koh, “Why do Nations Obey International Law?”, 106, Yale Law Journal (1997), 2599.

  43. 43.

    Thomas Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 312.

  44. 44.

    Trubek et al., “Soft Law, Hard Law, and EU Integration”, supra, note 25, at 3.

  45. 45.

    Shaffer and Pollack, “Hard Law vs. Soft Law”, supra, note 6, at 3.

  46. 46.

    See Martti Koskenniemi, “Turn to Ethics in International Law”, available at: http://www.helsinki.fi/eci/Publications/Koskenniemi/Ethics.pdf (last accessed on 22 February 2012); also, see Martti Koskenniemi, “The Lady Doth Protest too Much: Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics in International Law”, 65 The Modern Law Review (2002), 159.

  47. 47.

    Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and Vihma, “Comparing the Effectiveness and Legitimacy”, supra, note 34, at 405.

  48. 48.

    See, for example, Oran Young, The Institutional Dimensions of Environmental Change (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2002).

  49. 49.

    Abbott and Snidal, “Hard and Soft Law”, supra, note 7.

  50. 50.

    Oran Young, Leslie King and Heike Schroeder, Institutions and Environmental Change: Principle Findings, Applications, and Research Frontiers (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2008).

  51. 51.

    Abbott and Snidal, “Hard and Soft Law”, supra, note 6, at 422.

  52. 52.

    The ex-post view is more at home in a situation where a judge faces the decision in a court on whether a given instrument is binding or not. However, this view should not be simplified to the extreme either, see Shaffer and Pollack, “Hard Law vs. Soft Law”, supra, note 6, at 12.

  53. 53.

    Martti Koskenniemi, “International Law: Between Fragmentation and Constitutionalism”, available at: http://www.helsinki.fi/eci/Publications/Koskenniemi/MCanberra-06c.pdf (last accessed on 22 February 2012). Most themes Koskenniemi touches upon in this key presentation feature in his collection of essays, Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011). See also Klabbers, “The Undesirability of Soft Law”, supra, note 30; Klabbers, “Reflections on Soft International Law”, supra, note 18.

  54. 54.

    Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope, “International Law and Constructivism: Elements of an Interactional Theory of International Law”, 39 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (2000), 19; Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope, “Interactional International Law”, 3 International Law Forum (2001), 186; Marthe Finnemore and Stephen Toope, “Alternatives to “Legalization”: Richer Views of Law and Politics”, 55 International Organization (2001), 743.

  55. 55.

    Finnemore and Toope, “Alternatives to ‘Legalization’”, supra, note 55.

  56. 56.

    Brian Tamahana, A General Jurisprudence of Law and Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

  57. 57.

    Brunnée and Toope, “Interactional International Law”, supra, note 55.

  58. 58.

    Koskenniemi, “Turn to Ethics”, supra, note 47, at 22.

  59. 59.

    Klabbers, “The Undesirability of Soft Law”, supra, note 30, at 382.

  60. 60.

    Klabbers, “Reflections on Soft International Law”, supra, note 18, paragraph IV.

  61. 61.

    Klabbers, “The Undesirability of Soft Law”, supra, note 30.

  62. 62.

    Klabbers, “Reflections on Soft International Law”, supra, note 18. See for example paragraph II, “Any definition, or even any broader concept of soft law, has so far proved highly elusive”, and “if everything is law, nothing is”.

  63. 63.

    Klabbers, “Reflections on Soft International Law”, supra, note 18, at paragraph V.

  64. 64.

    Klabbers, “Reflections on Soft International Law”, supra, note 18, at paragraph II; Koskenniemi, “International law”, supra, note 51.

  65. 65.

    Koskenniemi, “International Law”, supra, note 51; see also Martti Koskenniemi, “The Politics of International Law – 20 years later” in Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law, supra, note 54.

  66. 66.

    Koskenniemi, “International Law”, supra, note 54.

  67. 67.

    Koskenniemi, “International Law”, supra, note 54, paragraph 8.

  68. 68.

    Koskenniemi, “International Law” supra, note 54; see also Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

  69. 69.

    Koskenniemi is fiercely critical of the “deformalisation” of international law. See for example Koskenniemi, “International Law”, supra, note 54, paragraphs 17 and 21.

  70. 70.

    Koskenniemi, “International Law”, supra, note 54, paragraphs 20 and 21.

  71. 71.

    Koskenniemi, “International Law”, supra, note 54, paragraph 9.

  72. 72.

    Koskenniemi, “International Law”, supra, note 54, paragraph 9.

  73. 73.

    Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

  74. 74.

    Koskenniemi, “International Law”, supra, note 54, paragraphs 20 and 25.

  75. 75.

    Koskenniemi, “International Law”, supra, note 54; Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason (1781), available at: http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/k/kant/immanuel/k16p/part1.2.html (last accessed on 22 February 2012).

  76. 76.

    See discussion in Jekwu Ikeme, “Equity, Environmental Justice and Sustainability: Incomplete Approaches in Climate Change Politics”, 13 Global Environmental Change (2003), 195.

  77. 77.

    See Frtitz W. Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); Robyn Eckersley, “Ambushed: The Kyoto Protocol, the Bush Administration’s Climate Policy and the Erosion of Legitimacy”, 44 International Politics (2007), 308.

  78. 78.

    See also Eckersley, “Ambushed: The Kyoto Protocol”, supra, note 78.

  79. 79.

    Shelton, “Introduction”, supra, note 19.

  80. 80.

    See supra, notes 10, 11 and 12.

  81. 81.

    See for example Yamin and Depledge, The International Climate Change Regime, supra, note 9.

  82. 82.

    Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal, “Pathways to Cooperation”, in Eyal Benvenisti and Moshe Hirsch (eds), The Impact of International Law on International Cooperation: Theoretical Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), at 50.

  83. 83.

    Article 5, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Washington, 4 April 1949, in force 24 August 1949, 34 United Nations Treaty Series, 243.

  84. 84.

    Article 4.5, UNFCCC, supra, note 12.

  85. 85.

    Lavanya Rajamani, “From Berlin to Bali and Beyond: Killing Kyoto Softly?”, 57 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2008), 909.

  86. 86.

    Joyeeta Gupta, The Climate Change Convention and Developing Countries: From Conflict to Consensus? (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997), 249.

  87. 87.

    Michael Glennon, Constitutional Diplomacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).

  88. 88.

    Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope, “Environmental Security and Freshwater Resources: Ecosystem Regime Building”, 91 The American Journal of International Law (1997).

  89. 89.

    Koskenniemi, “International Law”, supra, note 54, paragraph 15 and paragraph 25.

  90. 90.

    Trubek et al., “soft Law, Hard Law, and EU Integration”, supra, note 25; Braithwaite & Drahos, Global Business Regulation; Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An Interactional Account (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

  91. 91.

    Abbott and Snidal, “Hard and Soft Law”, supra, note 7; Shaffer and Pollack, “Hard Law vs. Soft Law”, supra, note 6.

  92. 92.

    Stephen Krasner, International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), at 3.

  93. 93.

    See Antto Vihma, “India and the Global Climate Governance: Between Principles and Pragmatism”, 20 Journal of Environment & Development (2011), 69.

  94. 94.

    The vertical interaction between levels of governance is also a case in point. The vertical dynamics include international soft law, which can “harden” at lower levels of governance; for example, when a principle from a soft international declaration is elaborated into a more binding instrument nationally or regionally. See, for example, Jeremy Wates, “The Aarhus Convention: A Driving Force for Environmental Democracy”, 2 The Journal for European & Environmental Planning Law (2005).

  95. 95.

    Chinkin, “Normative Development in the International Legal System”, supra, note 17.

  96. 96.

    Sylvia Karlsson, Multilayered Governance: Pesticides in the South – Environmental Concerns in a

    Globalised World (Linköping: Linköping University, 2000).

  97. 97.

    Shaffer and Pollack, “Hard Law vs. Soft Law”, supra, note 6, at 2.

  98. 98.

    Christine Chinkin, “The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law”, 38 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1989), 850.

  99. 99.

    See for example Frank Biermann et al., “The Fragmentation of Global Governance Architectures: A Framework for Analysis”, 9 Global Environmental Politics (2009), 14; Sebastian Oberthür and Thomas Gehring (eds), Institutional Interaction in Global Environmental Governance (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2006); Young, The Institutional Dimensions, supra, note 49.

  100. 100.

    Biermann et al., “The Fragmentation of Global Governance Architectures”, supra, note 100.

  101. 101.

    Young, The Institutional Dimensions, supra, note 49, at 112–113.

  102. 102.

    See, for instance, the chapter by Camilla Bausch and Michael Mehling in this volume.

  103. 103.

    Abbott and Snidal, “Hard and Soft Law”, supra, note 7, at 425.

  104. 104.

    Brunnée and Toope, “Legitimacy and Legality”, supra, note 91.

  105. 105.

    For a very recent example see Daniel Bodansky, “A Tale of Two Architectures: The Once and Future UN Climate Regime”, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1773865 (last accessed on 22 February 2012).

  106. 106.

    See for example “Greenpeace Guide to Kyoto, Bali, APEC, the G8 and Major Emitters Meeting”, Greenpeace Briefing, available at: http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/Global/usa/report/2007/11/greenpeace-guide-to-kyoto-bal.pdf (last accessed on 22 February 2012).

  107. 107.

    These difficulties are featured, for example, in Vihma, “India and the Global Climate Governance”, supra, note 94.

  108. 108.

    Decision 1/17.CP, Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, UNFCCC, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1, 15 March 2012, available at: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cop17/eng/09a01.pdf (last accessed on 22 February 2012).

  109. 109.

    Rajamani, “Deconstructing Durban”, Indian Express, 15 December 2011.

  110. 110.

    Rajamani, “Deconstructing Durban”, Indian Express, 15 December 2011.

  111. 111.

    Decision 1/CP.17, supra, note 109.

  112. 112.

    Rajamani, “Deconstructing Durban”, Indian Express, 15 December 2011.

  113. 113.

    Articles 5, 7 and 8, Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto, 10 December 1997, in force 16 February 2005, 37 International Legal Materials (1998), 22.

  114. 114.

    Rajamani, “From Berlin to Bali and Beyond”, supra, note 86; Rajamani, “The Cancun Climate Agreements: Reading the Text, Subtext and Tea Leaves”, 60 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2011), 499.

  115. 115.

    Decision 1/CP.16, The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention, UNFCCC, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, 15 March 2011, paragraphs 36–38; Decision 1/CP.13, The Bali Action Plan, UNFCCC, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1, 14 March 2007, paragraph 1 (b) (i).

  116. 116.

    Decision 1/CP.16, supra, note 116, paragraph 44; decision 1/CP.13, supra, note 116, paragraph 1 (b) (i).

  117. 117.

    Information documents have no legal status in the process, but are commonly used for example as a way to distribute the list of participants.

  118. 118.

    See, for example, submissions from the US, available at: http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_15/copenhagen_accord/application/pdf/unitedstatescphaccord_app.1.pdf (last accessed on 22 February 2012).

  119. 119.

    Decision 1/CP.16, supra, note 116, paragraph 63.

  120. 120.

    For example Lokh Sabha of the Indian Parliament, 21 December 2009 (transcript on file with author).

  121. 121.

    Decision 1/CP.13, supra, note 116, Article 1 b (ii).

  122. 122.

    Bali COP-13, final plenary, 15 December 2007.

  123. 123.

    Trubek et al., “Soft Law, Hard Law, and EU Integration”, supra, note 25.

  124. 124.

    Young et al., “Institutions and Environmental Change”, supra, note 51, at 3.

  125. 125.

    Antto Vihma and Kati Kulovesi, “Strengthening the Global Climate Change Negotiations”, Nordic Council of Ministers Working Paper (forthcoming, 2012).

  126. 126.

    Vihma, “Climate of Consensus”, supra, note 15.

  127. 127.

    “One of the core findings of our research program is that the current consensus principle as it is being implemented in the climate negotiation, but also in many other international environmental negotiations, is obsolete.” Professor Frank Biermann, interview with Deutsche Welle 27 March 2012, available at: http://www.dw.de/dw/article/0,,15840057,00.html (last accessed on 25 May 2012).

  128. 128.

    Rafael Leal-Arcas, “Top-Down versus Bottom-Up Approaches for Climate Change Negotiations: An Analysis”, 6 IUP Journal of Governance and Public Policy 6 (2011).

  129. 129.

    Many scholars have discussed these issues, see for example Xinuan Dai, International Institutions and National Policies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

  130. 130.

    Notably, the classic critique presented by Koskenniemi is not only about international law being apologetic, but about being caught between the destructive dynamics of apology and utopia. See Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, supra, note 69.

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Vihma, A. (2013). Analyzing Soft Law and Hard Law in Climate Change. In: Hollo, E., Kulovesi, K., Mehling, M. (eds) Climate Change and the Law. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 21. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5440-9_7

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