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Managing the Fragmentation of International Climate Law

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Climate Change and the Law

Part of the book series: Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice ((IUSGENT,volume 21))

Abstract

This chapter focuses on the fragmentation of international law related to climate change and the interactions between the relevant legal regimes. It examines various management strategies with a view to enhancing synergies and mitigating conflicts between climate-related international legal regimes. The chapter starts with an overview of the ongoing debate on the fragmentation of international law. It then identifies the features of international climate lawmaking and implementation that constrain the usefulness of well-known legal techniques for avoiding and resolving conflicts. The chapter moves on to show how institutional cooperation between poli­tical bodies and bureaucracies may lead to enhanced coherence between the climate change regime and other legal regimes, while arguing that such a strategy will also encounter specific concerns related to their legitimacy. The chapter concludes by highlighting the need to apply various strategies for managing the fragmentation of international climate law, and identifies areas for further inquiry in this regard.

Harro van Asselt is a postdoctoral research fellow at the Stockholm Environment Institute. He is also a visiting research associate with the Environmental Change Institute at the University of Oxford and a visiting researcher with the Institute for Environmental Studies at VU University Amsterdam. The author would like to acknowledge funding from the European Commission (Intra-European Fellowship, CLIMATEGOV; contract 253090).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Horst W.J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning”, 4 Policy Sciences (1973), 155, at 160–169.

  2. 2.

    For an excellent discussion of different framings of the climate change problem, see Mike Hulme, Why We Disagree about Climate Change: Understanding Controversy, Inaction and Opportunity (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

  3. 3.

    Kelly Levin et al., “Playing It Forward: Path Dependency, Progressive Incrementalism, and the ‘Super Wicked’ Problem of Global Climate Change”, paper presented at the International Studies Association Convention, Geneva, 28 February–3 March 2007, at 4–9; Richard J. Lazarus, “Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future”, 94 Cornell Law Review (2009), 1153, at 1159–1183.

  4. 4.

    Levin et al., “Playing It Forward”, supra, note 3, at 8–9.

  5. 5.

    Ibid., at 9.

  6. 6.

    Daniel H. Cole, “Climate Change and Collective Action”, 61 Current Legal Problems (2008), 229, at 232.

  7. 7.

    Levin et al., “Playing It Forward”, supra, note 3, at 9.

  8. 8.

    Lazarus, “Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change”, supra, note 3, at 1174–1176.

  9. 9.

    I adopt the definition proposed by Margaret Young (which is in turn adapted from the consensus regime definition proposed by Stephen Krasner): “regimes are sets of norms, decision-making procedures and organisations coalescing around functional issue-areas and dominated by particular modes of behaviour, assumption and biases.” Margaret A. Young, “Introduction: The Productive Friction Between Regimes”, in Margaret A. Young (ed.), Regime Interaction in International Law: Facing Fragmentation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1, at 11. See also Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables”, in Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 1, at 2.

  10. 10.

    Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Vienna, 22 March 1985, in force 22 September 1988, 26 International Legal Materials (1987), 1529.

  11. 11.

    Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Montreal, 16 September 1987, in force 1 January 1989, 26 International Legal Materials (1987), 1550.

  12. 12.

    Sebastian Oberthür, Claire Dupont and Yasuko Matsumoto, “Managing Policy Contradictions Between the Montreal and Kyoto Protocols: The Case of Fluorinated Greenhouse Gases”, in Sebastian Oberthür and Olav Schram Stokke (eds), Managing Institutional Complexity: Regime Interplay and Global Environmental Change (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2011), 115.

  13. 13.

    Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, in force 29 December 1993, 34 International Legal Materials (1992), 822.

  14. 14.

    See, for instance, Rüdiger Wolfrum and Nele Matz, Conflicts in International Environmental Law (Berlin: Springer, 2003); Imke Sagemüller, “Forest Sinks under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol: Opportunity or Risk for Biodiversity?”, 31 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law (2006), 189; Harro van Asselt, “Integrating Biodiversity in the Climate Regime’s Forest Rules: Options and Tradeoffs in Greening REDD Design”, 20 Review of European Community and International Environmental Law (2011), 139; Harro van Asselt, “Managing the Fragmentation of International Environmental Law: Forests at the Intersection of the Climate and Biodiversity Regimes”, 44 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics (2012, forthcoming).

  15. 15.

    See, for instance, Ludivine Tamiotti et al., Trade and Climate Change: A Report by the United Nations Environment Programme and the World Trade Organization (Geneva: WTO Secretariat, 2009); Tracey Epps and Andrew Green, Reconciling Trade and Climate: How the WTO Can Help Address Climate Change (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2010); Fariborz Zelli and Harro van Asselt, “The Overlap Between the UN Climate Regime and the World Trade Organization: Lessons for post-2012 Climate Governance”, in Frank Biermann, Philipp Pattberg and Fariborz Zelli (eds), Global Climate Governance Beyond 2012: Architecture, Agency and Adaptation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 79.

  16. 16.

    See, for instance, Karen N. Scott, “The Day After Tomorrow: Ocean CO2 Sequestration and the Future of Climate Change”, 18 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review (2005), 57; Meinhard Doelle, “Climate Change and the Use of the Dispute Settlement Regime of the Law of the Sea Convention”, 37 Ocean Development and International Law (2006), 319.

  17. 17.

    Stephen Humphreys (ed.), Human Rights and Climate Change (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Edward Cameron, “Human Rights and Climate Change: Moving from an Intrinsic to an Instrumental Approach”, 38 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law (2010), 673; Ole W. Pedersen, “The Janus-Head of Human Rights and Climate Change: Adaptation and Mitigation”, 80 Nordic Journal of International Law (2011), 403.

  18. 18.

    See, for instance, Erika Rosenthal and Robert Watson 2011, “Multilateral Efforts to Reduce Black Carbon Emissions: A Lifeline for the Warming Arctic?”, 20 Review of European Community and International Environmental Law (2011), 3.

  19. 19.

    See notably Bruno Simma, “Self-Contained Regimes”, 16 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law (1985), 845.

  20. 20.

    Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, UN. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, 13 April 2006, para. 729; On the fragmentation of international law see, for instance, Martti Koskenniemi and Päivi Leino, “Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties”, 15 Leiden Journal of International Law (2002), 553; Matthew Craven, “Unity, Diversity and the Fragmentation of International Law”, 14 The Finnish Yearbook of International Law (2003), 3; Gerhard Hafner, “Pros and Cons Ensuring From Fragmentation of International Law”, 25 Michigan Journal of International Law (2004), 849; Joost Pauwelyn, “Bridging Fragmentation and Unity: International Law as a Universe of Inter-Connected Islands”, 25 Michigan Journal of International Law (2004), 903; Eyal Benvenisti and George W. Downs, “The Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law”, 60 Stanford Law Review (2007), 595; Alexandra Khrebtukova, “A Call to Freedom: Towards a Philosophy of International Law in an Era of Fragmentation”, 4 Journal of International Law and International Relations (2008), 51; Margaret A. Young (ed.), Regime Interaction in International Law: Facing Fragmentation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

  21. 21.

    ILC, Fragmentation of International Law, supra, note 20.

  22. 22.

    Ibid.

  23. 23.

    Ibid., para. 493.

  24. 24.

    Exceptions include Harro van Asselt, Francesco Sindico and Michael A. Mehling, “Global Climate Change and the Fragmentation of International Law”, 30 Law & Policy (2008), 423; Harro Van Asselt, “Legal and Political Approaches in Interplay Management: Dealing with the Fragmentation of Global Climate Governance”, in Sebastian Oberthür and Olav Schram Stokke (eds), Managing Institutional Complexity: Regime Interplay and Global Environmental Change (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2011), 59; Margaret A. Young, “Climate Change Law and Regime Interaction”, 4 Carbon and Climate Law Review (2011), 147; Margaret A. Young, Trading Fish, Saving Fish: The Interaction between Regimes in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Cinnamon Piñon Carlane, “Good Climate Governance: Only a Fragmented System of International Law Away?”, 30 Law &Policy (2008), 450; Karen N. Scott, “International Environmental Governance: Managing Fragmentation Through Institutional Connection”, 12 Melbourne Journal of International Law (2011), 177.

  25. 25.

    Edith Brown-Weiss, “International Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues and the Emergence of a New Order”, 81 Georgetown Law Journal (1993), 675, at 697–702. See also Bethany Lukitsch Hicks, “Treaty Congestion In International Environmental Law: The Need For Greater International Coordination, Comment”, 32 University of Richmond Law Review (1999), 1643; Donald K. Anton, “Treaty Congestion’ in Contemporary International Environmental Law”, in Shawkat Alam et al. (eds), Routledge Handbook of International Environmental Law (London: Routledge, 2012, forthcoming).

  26. 26.

    See, for instance, Steinar Andresen, “Global Environmental Governance: UN Fragmentation and Co-ordination”, in Olav Schram Stokke and Øystein B. Thommessen (eds), Yearbook of International Co-operation on Environment and Development 2001/2002 (London: Earthscan, 2001), 19; Steven Bernstein and Maria Ivanova, “Institutional Fragmentation and Normative Compromise in Global Environmental Governance: What Prospects for Re-embedding?”, in Steven Bernstein and Louis W. Pauly (eds), Global Liberalism and Political Order: Towards a New Grand Compromise? (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007), 161.

  27. 27.

    Notable exceptions are Wolfrum and Matz, Conflicts in International Environmental Law, supra, note 14, at 119–209; W. Bradnee Chambers, Interlinkages and the Effectiveness of Multilateral Environmental Agreements (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2008); Young, Trading Fish, Saving Fish, supra, note 24.

  28. 28.

    The term also has also led to discussions in the international relations literature. See Frank Biermann et al., “The Fragmentation of Global Governance Architectures: A Framework for Analysis”, 9 Global Environmental Politics (2009), 14, at 16–17.

  29. 29.

    Koskenniemi and Leino, “Fragmentation of International Law?”, supra, note 20, at 576–577.

  30. 30.

    Mario Prost, “All Shouting the Same Slogans: International Law’s Unities and the Politics of Fragmentation”, 17 Finnish Yearbook of International Law (2006), 131, at 158.

  31. 31.

    Anne-Charlotte Martineau, “The Rhetoric of Fragmentation: Fear and Faith in International Law”, 22 Leiden Journal of International Law (2009), 1, at 27. For instance, “diversity” was contrasted with “cacophony” in a special issue of the Michigan Journal of International Law focusing on the advantages and drawbacks of the fragmentation of international law. See, for example, Bruno Simma, “Fragmentation in a Positive Light”, 25 Michigan Journal of International Law (2004), 845, at 845. Pluralism is generally seen as a benign development by legal pluralists. See, for instance, Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Gunther Teubner, “Regime-Collisions: the Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law”, 25 Michigan Journal of International Law (2004), 999. For a recent discussion of polycentricity in a positive light, see Elinor Ostrom, “Polycentric Systems for Coping with Collective Action and Global Environmental Change”, 20 Global Environmental Change (2010), 550.

  32. 32.

    ILC, Fragmentation of International Law, supra, note 20, para. 13.

  33. 33.

    Georges Abi-Saab, “Fragmentation or Unification: Some Concluding Remarks”, 31 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics (1999), 919, at 925.

  34. 34.

    For a discussion of the case, see Marcos A. Orellana, “The Swordfish Dispute between the EU and Chile at the ITLOS and the WTO”, 71 Nordic Journal of International Law (2002), 55.

  35. 35.

    Tomer Broude, “Principles of Normative Integration and the Allocation of International Authority: The WTO, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and the Rio Declaration”, 6 Loyola University Chicago International Law Review (2008), 173, at 182–183.

  36. 36.

    ILC, Fragmentation of International Law, supra, note 20, para. 47.

  37. 37.

    Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Judgment, 15 July 1999, Case No. IT-94-1-A, A.Ch.

  38. 38.

    Martti Koskenniemi, “Breach of Treaty or Non-Compliance: Reflections on the Enforcement of the Montreal Protocol”, 3 Yearbook of International Environmental Law (1992), 123.

  39. 39.

    See, for instance, Biermann et al., “The Fragmentation of Global Governance Architectures”, supra, note 28; Robert O. Keohane and David G. Victor, “The Regime Complex for Climate Change”, 9 Perspectives on Politics (2011), 7.

  40. 40.

    Gerhard Hafner, “Risks Ensuing from Fragmentation of International Law”, Official Records of the General Assembly, 55th session, Supplement No. 10 (A/55/10, 2000), Annex, 143 at 147.

  41. 41.

    Pierre-Marie Dupuy, “The Danger of Fragmentation or Unification of the International Legal System and the International Court of Justice”, 31 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics (1999), 791; Benedict Kingsbury, “Is the Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals a Systemic Problem?”, 31 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics (1999), 679.

  42. 42.

    ILC, Fragmentation of International Law, supra, note 20, paras. 10 and 439–442.

  43. 43.

    Benvenisti and Downs, “The Empire’s New Clothes”, supra, note 20, at 628.

  44. 44.

    Craven, “Unity, Diversity and the Fragmentation of International Law”, supra, note 20, at 5; ILC, Fragmentation of International Law, supra, note 20, para. 493.

  45. 45.

    Khrebtukova, “A Call to Freedom”, supra, note 20, at 56.

  46. 46.

    Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), at 600–615. See also Martti Koskenniemi, “Hegemonic Regimes”, in Margaret A. Young (ed.), Regime Interaction in International Law: Facing Fragmentation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 305.

  47. 47.

    For a comparison of the dispute settlement mechanisms of the WTO and multilateral environmental agreements, see Alexandra González-Calatayud and Gabrielle Marceau, “The Relationship between the Dispute-Settlement Mechanisms of MEAs and those of the WTO”, 11 Review of European Community and International Environmental Law (2002), 275.

  48. 48.

    Anja Lindroos and Michael Mehling, “Dispelling the Chimera of ‘Self-Contained Regimes’: International Law and the WTO”, 16 European Journal of International Law (2005), 857, at 859.

  49. 49.

    Koskenniemi and Leino, “Fragmentation of International Law?”, supra, note 20, at 578.

  50. 50.

    Benvenisti and Downs, “The Empire’s New Clothes”, supra, note 20, at 602.

  51. 51.

    Hafner, “Pros and Cons Ensuing from Fragmentation of International Law”, supra, note 20, at 859.

  52. 52.

    Moisés Naím, “Minilateralism. The Magic Number to Get Real International Action”, Foreign Policy (2009), 135.

  53. 53.

    Jonathan Charney, “The Impact on the International Legal System of the Growth of International Courts and Tribunals”, 31 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics (1999), 697, at 700.

  54. 54.

    Biermann et al., “The Fragmentation of Global Governance Architectures”, supra, note 28, at 27.

  55. 55.

    ILC, Fragmentation of International Law, supra, note 20, para. 492.

  56. 56.

    See, for instance, Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law. How WTO Law Relates to other Rules of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Christina Voigt, Sustainable Development as a Principle of International Law. Resolving Conflicts between Climate Measures and WTO Law (Leiden: Brill, 2008).

  57. 57.

    See notably Voigt, ibid., at 265–292.

  58. 58.

    Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, 22 May 1969, in force 27 January 1980, 8 International Legal Materials (1989), 679.

  59. 59.

    ILC, Fragmentation of International Law, supra, note 20, paras. 410–480.

  60. 60.

    Philippe Sands, “Treaty, Custom and the Cross-fertilization of International Law”, 1 Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal (1998), 85; Campbell McLachlan, “The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention”, 54 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2005), 279; Duncan French, “Treaty Interpretation and the Incorporation of Extraneous Legal Rules”, 55 International Comparative Law Quarterly (2006), 281; Broude, “Principles of Normative Integration and the Allocation of International Authority”, supra, note 35; Anja Lindroos and Michael Mehling, “From Autonomy to Integration? International Law, Free Trade and the Environment”, 77 Nordic Journal of International Law (2008), 253; Panos Merkouris, “Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT and the Principle of Systemic Integration” (PhD thesis on file at the Queen Mary University of London, College of Law), 2010, available at: https://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/jspui/bitstream/123456789/477/1/MERKOURISArticle%2031(3)(c)2010.pdf (last accessed on 14 February 2012); Riccardo Pavoni, “Mutual Supportiveness as a Principle of Interpretation and Law-Making: A Watershed for the ‘WTO-and-Competing-Regimes’ Debate?”, 21 European Journal of International Law (2010), 649; Mélanie Samson, “High Hopes, Scant Resources: A Word of Scepticism about the Anti-Fragmentation Function of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties”, 24 Leiden Journal of International Law (2011), 701.

  61. 61.

    Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra, note 58, Art. 31.3(c).

  62. 62.

    Merkouris, “Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT and the Principle of Systemic Integration”, supra, note 60, at 8.

  63. 63.

    McLachlan, “The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention”, supra, note 60, at 280.

  64. 64.

    Pavoni, “Mutual Supportiveness as a Principle of Interpretation and Law-Making”, supra, note 60, at 678.

  65. 65.

    Lindroos and Mehling, “From Autonomy to Integration?”, supra, note 60, at 268.

  66. 66.

    McLachlan, “The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention”, supra, note 60, at 295–309. However, as Lindroos and Mehling observe, the case law is rather recent, and provides only a “weak basis for an actual principle of systemic integration”. Lindroos and Mehling, “From Autonomy to Integration?”, supra, note 60, at 268.

  67. 67.

    United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the Appellate Body, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R, 6 November 1998, para. 158.

  68. 68.

    Concetta Maria Pontecorvo, “Interdependence between Global Environmental Regimes: The Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change and Forest Protection”, 59 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (1999), 709, at 741.

  69. 69.

    Harro van Asselt, Francesco Sindico and Michael A. Mehling, “Global Climate Change and the Fragmentation of International Law”, supra, note 24, at 435–436; Navraj Singh Ghaleigh and David Rossati, “The Spectre of Carbon Border-Adjustment Measures”, 2 Climate Law (2011), 63, at 71–72.

  70. 70.

    Art. XX(b) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 15 April 1994, in force 1 January 1995, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 33 International Legal Materials (1994), 1153.

  71. 71.

    Ibid., Art. XX(g).

  72. 72.

    McLachlan, “The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention”, supra, note 60, at 280–281.

  73. 73.

    Sands, “Treaty, Custom and the Cross-fertilization of International Law”, supra, note 60, at 103; ILC, Fragmentation of International Law, supra, note 20, para. 423.

  74. 74.

    ILC, Fragmentation of International Law, supra, note 20, para. 473–474; Voigt, Sustainable Development as a Principle of International Law, supra, note 56, at 282.

  75. 75.

    Voigt, Sustainable Development as a Principle of International Law, supra, note 56, at 284–286.

  76. 76.

    ILC, Fragmentation of International Law, supra, note 20, paras. 433–460.

  77. 77.

    Lindroos and Mehling, “From Autonomy to Integration?”, supra, note 60, at 270.

  78. 78.

    Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 29 January 2000, in force 11 September 2003, 39 International Legal Materials (2000), 1027.

  79. 79.

    European Community – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, Reports of the Panel, WTO Doc. WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R, 29 September 2006, at para. 7.71. (Biotech).

  80. 80.

    For this reason, the Panel’s approach has been criticized, for instance, by Margaret A. Young, “The WTO’s Use of Relevant Rules of International Law: An Analysis of the Biotech Case”, 56 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2008), 907, at 914–918.

  81. 81.

    Isabelle van Damme, Treaty Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), at 375; Samson, “High Hopes, Scant Resources”, supra, note 60, at 711–712.

  82. 82.

    Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra, note 58, at Art. 31.1. See also Miguel A. Elizande Carranza, “MEAs with Trade Measures and the WTO: Aiming toward Sustainable Development”, 15 Buffalo Environmental Law Journal (2007), 43, at 86–91.

  83. 83.

    Voigt, Sustainable Development as a Principle of International Law, supra, note 56, at 275–276.

  84. 84.

    Broude, “Principles of Normative Integration and the Allocation of International Authority”, supra, note 35, at 200.

  85. 85.

    Ibid., at 186–187.

  86. 86.

    Ibid., at 187.

  87. 87.

    Pavoni, “Mutual Supportiveness as a Principle of Interpretation and Law-Making”, supra, note 60.

  88. 88.

    Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law, supra, note 56, at 328.

  89. 89.

    United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, New York, 9 May 1992, in force 21 March 1994, 31 International Legal Materials (1992), 849.

  90. 90.

    Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto, 10 December 1997, in force 16 February 2005, 37 International Legal Materials (1998), 22.

  91. 91.

    See, for instance, UNFCCC, supra, note 89, Art. 4.1(a); Ibid., Art. 5.1.

  92. 92.

    Sebastian Oberthür, “Linkages between the Montreal and Kyoto Protocols: Enhancing Synergies between Protecting the Ozone Layer and the Global Climate”, 1 International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics (2001), 357.

  93. 93.

    Kyoto Protocol, supra, note 90, Art. 2.1(a)(ii).

  94. 94.

    Pontecorvo, “Interdependence between Global Environmental Regimes”, supra, note 65, at 739–740.

  95. 95.

    Frédéric Jacquemont and Alejandro Caparrós, “The Convention on Biological Diversity and the Climate Change Convention 10 Years After Rio: Towards a Synergy of the Two Regimes?”, 11 Review of European Community and International Environmental Law (2002), 139, at 178.

  96. 96.

    UNFCCC, supra, note 89, Art. 3.5.

  97. 97.

    Kyoto Protocol, supra, note 90, Art. 2.3

  98. 98.

    Voigt, Sustainable Development as a Principle of International Law, supra, note 56, at 299.

  99. 99.

    Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, supra, note 78, preamble (stating that “that this Protocol shall not be interpreted as implying a change in the rights and obligations of a Party under any existing international agreements”). For a discussion of the history of this clause, see Sabrina Safrin, “Treaties in Collision: The Biosafety Protocol and the World Trade Organization Agreements”, 96 American Journal of International Law (2002), 606, at 614–618. .

  100. 100.

    Olav Schram Stokke, “Trade Measures and Climate Compliance: Institutional Interplay Between WTO and the Marrakesh Accords”, 4 International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics (2004), 339, at 346.

  101. 101.

    Voigt, Sustainable Development as a Principle of International Law, supra, note 56, at 298.

  102. 102.

    Kyoto Protocol, supra, note 90, Art 2.2. See Sebastian Oberthür, “The Climate Change Regime: Interactions with ICAO, IMO, and the EU Burden-Sharing Agreement”, in Sebastian Oberthür and Thomas Gehring (eds), Institutional Interaction in Global Environmental Governance. Synergy and Conflict among International and EU Policies (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2006), 53, at 59–68.

  103. 103.

    Convention on Biological Diversity, supra, note 13, Art. 22.1.

  104. 104.

    Wolfrum and Matz, Conflicts in International Environmental Law, supra, note 14, at 124.

  105. 105.

    Ibid., at 125; ILC, Fragmentation of International Law, supra, note 20, para. 280; Malgosia Fitzmaurice and Olefumi A. Elias, Contemporary Issues in the Law of Treaties (Utrecht: Eleven Publishing, 2005), at 244–345.

  106. 106.

    United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, in force 16 November 1994, 21 International Legal Materials (1982), 1261, Art. 311.3.

  107. 107.

    E.W. Vierdag, “The Time of the ‘Conclusion’ of a Multilateral Treaty: Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and Related Provisions”, 59 British Yearbook of International Law (1988), 75.

  108. 108.

    Jacob Werksman, “Formal Linkages and Multilateral Environmental Agreements”, 1999, available at: http://archive.unu.edu/inter-linkages/1999/docs/jake.PDF (last accessed on 14 February 2012).

  109. 109.

    Wolfrum and Matz, Conflicts in International Environmental Law, supra, note 14, at 128.

  110. 110.

    Wilfred Jenks, “The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties”, 30 British Yearbook of International Law (1953), 401, at 452.

  111. 111.

    Hicks, “Treaty Congestion in International Environmental Law”, supra, note 25, at 1669–1673.

  112. 112.

    Jenks, “The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties”, supra, note 110, at 452.

  113. 113.

    For an overview of the debate, see Erich Vranes, Trade and the Environment. Fundamental Issues in International and WTO Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), at 10–38.

  114. 114.

    Jenks, “The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties”, supra, note 102, at 426.

  115. 115.

    Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law, supra, note 56, at 166–175 and Vranes, Trade and the Environment, supra, note 113, at 19–21.

  116. 116.

    Vranes, Trade and the Environment, supra, note 113, at 38.

  117. 117.

    Jenks, “The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties”, supra, note 110, at 426.

  118. 118.

    Vranes, Trade and the Environment, supra, note 113, at 20.

  119. 119.

    Wolfrum and Matz, Conflicts in International Environmental Law, supra, note 14, at 7–13.

  120. 120.

    Ibid., at 11.

  121. 121.

    In dealing with regime interactions, Dunoff highlights the lack of a “redemptive narrative”. With this, he refers to the lack of overarching guidance that could help lawyers in deciding how to integrate regimes. See, Jeffrey Dunoff, “A New Approach to Regime Interaction”, in Margaret A. Young (ed.), Regime Interaction in International Law: Facing Fragmentation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 136, at 155.

  122. 122.

    Vranes, Trade and the Environment, supra, note 113, at 19.

  123. 123.

    Khrebtukova, “A Call to Freedom”, supra, note 20, at 63.

  124. 124.

    For instance, Voigt argues that sustainable development is enshrined in both the climate change and trade regimes. Voigt, Sustainable Development as a Principle of International Law, supra, note 56, at 89–144. Koskenniemi refers to sustainable development as one of the “regime hybrids… through which the experts representing the respective regimes may wage their struggle for influence”. See Koskenniemi, “Hegemonic Regimes”, supra, note 46, at 319–320.

  125. 125.

    Dunoff, “A New Approach to Regime Interaction”, supra, note 121. Koskenniemi is critical whether such a narrative in fact can be construed, citing the example of the legal scholarship on constitutionalization and global administrative law. Koskenniemi, “Hegemonic Regimes”, supra, note 46, at 320–321.

  126. 126.

    Van Asselt, “Managing the Fragmentation of International Environmental Law”, supra, note 14.

  127. 127.

    Van Asselt, “Integrating Biodiversity in the Climate Regime’s Forest Rules: Options and Tradeoffs in Greening REDD Design”, supra, note 14, at 141–143.

  128. 128.

    Jenks, “The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties”, supra, note 110, at 426.

  129. 129.

    See, generally, Robin R. Churchill and Geir Ulfstein, “Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in International Law”, 94 American Journal of International Law (2000), 623; Jutta Brunnée, “COPing with Consent: Law Making under Multilateral Environmental Agreements”, 15 Leiden Journal of International Law (2002), 1; Annecoos Wiersema, “The New International Law-makers? Conferences of the Parties to Multilateral Environmental Agreements”, 31 Michigan Journal of International Law (2009), 231.

  130. 130.

    Wiersema, “The New International Law-makers?”, supra, note 129, at 245. See also Fitzmaurice and Elias, Contemporary Issues in the Law of Treaties, supra, note 105, at 262 (referring to the Kyoto Protocol provisions on flexible mechanisms as “enabling clauses” for subsequent decisions by the treaty bodies); and Brunnée, “COPing with Consent”, supra, note 129, at 24 (referring to “enabling provisions”).

  131. 131.

    Wiersema, “The New International Law-makers?”, supra, note 129, at 247.

  132. 132.

    On the role and influence of bureaucracies in global environmental governance, see the contributions in Frank Biermann and Bernd Siebenhüner (eds), Managers of Global Change: The Influence of International Environmental Bureaucracies (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2009).

  133. 133.

    There are some notable exceptions, such as Sikina Jinnah, “Overlap Management in the World Trade Organization: Secretariat Influence on Trade-Environment Politics”, 10 Global Environmental Politics (2010), 64; Sikina Jinnah, “Marketing Linkages: Secretariat Governance of the Climate-Biodiversity Interface”, 11 Global Environmental Politics (2011), 23.

  134. 134.

    Churchill and Ulfstein, “Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral Environmental Agreements”, supra, note 129, at 649.

  135. 135.

    Chambers, Interlinkages and the Effectiveness of Multilateral Environmental Agreements, supra, note 27, at 66.

  136. 136.

    UNFCCC, supra, note 89, Art. 8.2(e); Kyoto Protocol, supra, note 90, Art. 14.2.

  137. 137.

    Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, supra, note 10, Art. 7.1(e).

  138. 138.

    Convention on Biological Diversity, supra, note 13, Art. 24.1(d).

  139. 139.

    Jinnah, “Overlap Management in the World Trade Organization”, supra, note 133, at 68.

  140. 140.

    Tamiotti et al., Trade and Climate Change, supra, note 15.

  141. 141.

    United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in Those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Paris, Particularly in Africa, 17 June 1994, in force 26 December 1996, 33 International Legal Materials (1994), 1328.

  142. 142.

    Report of the Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technological Advice on the Second Part of Its Fourteenth Session, Bonn, 24–27 July 2001. U.N. Doc. FCCC/SBSTA/2001/2, 18 September 2011, para. 42(d).

  143. 143.

    Chambers, Interlinkages and the Effectiveness of Multilateral Environmental Agreements, supra, note 27, at 69.

  144. 144.

    Options for Enhanced Cooperation Among the Three Rio Conventions, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/SBSTTA/10/INF/9 Annex, 15 December 2004.

  145. 145.

    UNFCCC, supra, note 89, Art. 7.2(l); Kyoto Protocol, supra, note 90, Art. 13.4(i).

  146. 146.

    Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer, supra, note 10, Art. 2.2(d).

  147. 147.

    Convention on Biological Diversity 2004, supra, note 13, Art. 23.4(h).

  148. 148.

    Art. V.1 of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994, in force 1 January 1995, 33 International Legal Materials (1994), 1144.

  149. 149.

    Decision 13/CP.8, Cooperation with Other Conventions, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2002/7/Add.1, 28 March 2003, preamble.

  150. 150.

    Farhana Yamin and Joanna Depledge, The International Climate Change Regime: A Guide to Rules, Institutions and Procedures (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), at 523–524.

  151. 151.

    Decision XIX/6, Adjustments to the Montreal Protocol with Regard to Annex C, Group I, Substances (Hydrochlorofluorocarbons), U.N. Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.19/7, 21 September 2007.

  152. 152.

    Oberthür, Dupont and Matsumoto, “Managing Policy Contradictions Between the Montreal and Kyoto Protocols”, supra, note 12, at 128–129.

  153. 153.

    Olav Schram Stokke, “The Interplay of International Regimes: Putting Effectiveness Theory to Work?” Fridtjof Nansen Institute (FNI) Report 10/2001, 2001, available at: http://www.fni.no/doc&pdf/FNI-R1401.pdf (last accessed on 2 March 2012), at 12.

  154. 154.

    Scott, “International Environmental Governance”, supra, note 24, at 202–208.

  155. 155.

    Chambers, Interlinkages and the Effectiveness of Multilateral Environmental Agreements, supra, note 27, at 66.

  156. 156.

    Ibid., at 70–71.

  157. 157.

    Per-Olof Busch, “The Climate Secretariat: Making a Living in a Straitjacket”, in Frank Biermann and Bernd Siebenhüner (eds), Managers of Global Change: The Influence of International Environmental Bureaucracies (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2009), 225, at 225.

  158. 158.

    Jinnah, “Marketing Linkages: Secretariat Governance of the Climate-Biodiversity Interface”, supra, note 133.

  159. 159.

    Report of the Fifth Meeting of the Joint Liaison Group. U.N. Doc. FCCC/SBSTA/2004/INF.9, 15 June 2004, para. 4(l).

  160. 160.

    Report of the Meeting of the Joint Liaison Group of the Convention on Biological Diversity, the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (New York, 14 May 2009), para. 11.

  161. 161.

    Chambers, Interlinkages and the Effectiveness of Multilateral Environmental Agreements, supra, note 27, at 69.

  162. 162.

    Scott, “International Environmental Governance”, supra, note 24, at 212.

  163. 163.

    Wolfrum and Matz, Conflicts in International Environmental Law, supra, note 14, at 163.

  164. 164.

    Views on the Paper on Options for Enhanced Cooperation Among the Three Rio Conventions, Submissions from Parties, U.N. Doc. FCCC/SBSTA/2006/MISC.4, 23 March 2006, at 16.

  165. 165.

    Ibid., at 5.

  166. 166.

    Mireille Cossy and Gabrielle Marceau, “Institutional Challenges to Enhance Policy Co-ordination – How WTO Rules Could be Utilised to Meet Climate Objectives?”, in Thomas Cottier, Olga Nartova and Sadeq Z. Bigdeli (eds), International Trade Regulation and the Mitigation of Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 371, at 376.

  167. 167.

    Scott, “International Environmental Governance”, supra, note 24, at 211–215; Young, Trading Fish, Saving Fish, supra, note 24, at 281–287

  168. 168.

    Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, supra, note 46, at 600–615.

  169. 169.

    Scott, “International Environmental Governance”, supra, note 24, at 213.

  170. 170.

    Young, Trading Fish, Saving Fish, supra, note 24, at 277.

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van Asselt, H. (2013). Managing the Fragmentation of International Climate Law. In: Hollo, E., Kulovesi, K., Mehling, M. (eds) Climate Change and the Law. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 21. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5440-9_13

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