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Rationality and Experimental Economics

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Epistemology of Decision

Part of the book series: SpringerBriefs in Philosophy ((BRIEFSPHILOSOPH))

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Abstract

The theory of rational choice (TRC) is a model of explanation used by social science theorists to interpret behavior. Initially, the theory was the dominant paradigm of economics. A fundamental postulate of neoclassical economics was that economic phenomena primarily resulted from the action of agents who were fully rational, equal and therefore indistinguishable from each other and all agents pursuing their own personal and individual gain.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Cognitive Sciences, University of Messina, via Concezione 6-8, Messina, 98121, Italy

    Mario Graziano

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  1. Mario Graziano
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Graziano, M. (2013). Rationality and Experimental Economics. In: Epistemology of Decision. SpringerBriefs in Philosophy. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5428-7_1

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