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The Netherlands: Statutory Balancing and a Choice of Remedies

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Exclusionary Rules in Comparative Law

Part of the book series: Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice ((IUSGENT,volume 20))

Abstract

The search for the truth has always dominated Dutch Criminal Procedure, as it has most continental European criminal justice systems. The Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure, however, contains a provision that allows for exclusion of illegally gathered evidence, whether in violation of statutory rules or constitutional commands, after the judge engages in balancing various interests laid out in the statute. The Dutch provision says that, if a violation cannot be “remedied”, a concept often applied to certain “nullities” which can be “purged” or remedied, then the judge, taking into account the importance of the interest the rule protected, the seriousness of the violation, and the harm it caused to the rights of the defendant. If the judge finds a remedy is merited, he or she has several options. The most severe is to dismiss the entire criminal action, a remedy that is also available theoretically for the most serious “nullities”. The second option would be to prevent use of the evidence at trial, and the third, would be to reduce the defendant’s punishment due to the violation, but allow the evidence to be used at trial. This chapter thoroughly explores how the statutory provision is applied in different kinds of cases involving violations of the right to privacy and the right to silence and other rules relating to interrogations.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For literature on this subject, see: Embregts (2003, 2010), Van Woensel (2004, 119–171), Nijboer (2008, 138–156), Kuiper (2009, 35–59), and Corstens and Borgers (2011, 724–740).

  2. 2.

    There is no constitutional provision articulating the same principle.

  3. 3.

    An exception would be statements made by lawyers during closing arguments at trial or otherwise during the proceedings.

  4. 4.

    de Wilde (2008, 269–294), and Corstens and Borgers (2011, 712–716).

  5. 5.

    An important exception is contained in the rule that evidence that the accused has committed the offense charged can – not must – be assumed by the judge on the basis of an official report by an investigating officer. See § 344(2) CCP.

  6. 6.

    For a detailed explanation of the distinction between unreliable and illegally gathered evidence, see Dubelaar (2009, 93–105).

  7. 7.

    Dutch Law Reports (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie) 2004, 376 annotated by Buruma.

  8. 8.

    In principle, breaches of procedural rules relating to custodial means of coercion, which the accused could have put before the investigating magistrate (the judge in the preliminary investigation) at an earlier stage, are not assessed again by the session judge on the basis of § 359a CCP.

  9. 9.

    HR (Supreme Court) October 18, 1988, Dutch Law Reports (NJ) 1989, 306.

  10. 10.

    Cf. HR June 3, 2001, Dutch Law Reports 2001, 536.

  11. 11.

    Cf. HR March 26, 2002, Dutch Law Reports 2002, 343.

  12. 12.

    See for example HR January 12, 1999, Dutch Law Reports 1999, 290, in which evidence is excluded because a telephone call between a co-suspect and his lawyer was tapped. Tapping calls with professionals entitled to privilege constitutes a serious breach of procedural rules.

  13. 13.

    Cf. HR June19, 2001, Dutch Law Reports 2001, 574, annotated by Reijntjes.

  14. 14.

    See in particular HR December 19, 1995, Dutch Law Reports 1996, 249 annotated by Schalken.

  15. 15.

    HR February 4, 1997, Dutch Law Reports 1997, 308, annotated by Schalken and HR September 8, 1998, Dutch Law Reports 1998, 879, annotated by Schalken.

  16. 16.

    HR June 1, 1999, Dutch Law Reports 1999, 567, annotated by Schalken and HR June 8, 1999, Dutch Law Reports 1999, 773, annotated by Reijntjes.

  17. 17.

    See for example HR January 19, 1999, Dutch Law Reports 1999, 251.

  18. 18.

    Cf. HR February 8, 2000, Dutch Law Reports 2000, 316.

  19. 19.

    Cf. Embregts (2010, note 10.11 to § 359a).

  20. 20.

    See Sect. 8.3.

  21. 21.

    HR May 29, 2007, Dutch Law Reports 2008, 14, annotated by Reijntjes.

  22. 22.

    Cf. HR July 2, 2002, Dutch Law Reports 2002, 624.

  23. 23.

    HR March 21, 2000, LJN AA5254.

  24. 24.

    Cf. HR December 21, 2004, Dutch Law Reports 2005, 172, annotated by JR.

  25. 25.

    Such a direct connection means that the fruit of the poisonous tree must exclusively be the result of the unlawful actions. It is not sufficient (any more) that the fruit of the poisonous tree is largely the result of those actions. The recent case law of the Supreme Court is at any rate interpreted in this way.

  26. 26.

    Other possible reasons not to assume a causal connection can be based on alternative causality (evidence arising from an unlawful act, but at the same time also from an independent source) or due to the “inevitable discovery” exception (the evidence could most likely have been gathered legally as well). These reasons are put forth relatively rarely in the case law. See Embregts (2010, note 5.10 to § 359a).

  27. 27.

    Cf. HR February 24, 2004, Dutch Law Reports 2004, 226.

  28. 28.

    HR October 2, 2007, Dutch Law Reports 2008, 374, annotated by Legemaate.

  29. 29.

    See Corstens and Borgers (2011, 433–446, 473–501).

  30. 30.

    §§ 97, 110 CCP.

  31. 31.

    HR 16 June 2009, Dutch Law Reports 2009, 294.

  32. 32.

    §§ 126la–126nb, 126t–126ub and 126zg-zja CCP.

  33. 33.

    HR October 11, 2005, Dutch Law Reports 2006, 625.

  34. 34.

    See among others Groenhuijsen and Knigge (1999, 33). See also Prakken and Spronken (2001, 57–63).

  35. 35.

    Stevens (2005, Chapter 4).

  36. 36.

    Parliamentary Papers II 1913/14, 286, no. 3, 71. Cf. also the Explanatory Memorandum to the Draft-Staatscommissie (Government Committee) 1913, 67–70; Lindenberg (2002, 436–437).

  37. 37.

    Parliamentary Papers II 1935/36, 309, no. 3, 1–2.

  38. 38.

    This development is described by Stevens (2005, 51–53).

  39. 39.

    Cf. also HR January 16, 1928, Dutch Law Reports 1928, 233.

  40. 40.

    See among many others HR September 18, 1989, Dutch Law Reports 1990, 531, annotated by Van Veen. Asking for a telephone number can under certain circumstances come under the protection of § 29 CCP, and in that case must be preceded by reading the suspect his rights. This does not apply, however, if the suspect has already given permission to investigate his telephone traffic. See HR April 3, 2007, Dutch Law Reports 2007, 209.

  41. 41.

    HR October 1, 1985, Dutch Law Reports 1986, 405 and 406.

  42. 42.

    HR March 29, 2004, Dutch Law Reports 2004, 263. In this case, the Supreme Court relies on European case law. See ECHR, November 5, 2002, Dutch Law Reports 2004, 262 (Allan), annotated by Schalken. Even though the ECHR seems to dislike sneaky undercover practices somewhat more than the Supreme Court.

  43. 43.

    See e.g. HR November 12, 1974, Dutch Law Reports 1975, 41, annotated by Van Veen.

  44. 44.

    HR March 19, 1996, Dutch Law Reports 1996, 540, annotated by Schalken.

  45. 45.

    See for example HR January 17, 1978, Dutch Law Reports 1978, 341 and HR January 26, 1982, Dutch Law Reports 1982, 353.

  46. 46.

    Stevens (2005, 57).

  47. 47.

    For an overview of this case law, see Lensing (1988, 205–207). See also Jörg (2010, note 16 to § 29). Cf. also HR June 14, 2005, LJN AS8854.

  48. 48.

    Jörg (2010, note 16 to § 29).

  49. 49.

    HR March 25, 1980, Dutch Law Reports 1980, 437 and HR January 26, 1988, Dutch Law Reports 1988, 818. In this case, the judge did not use previous statements taken without rights being read, so the Supreme Court only had to deliberate on the question of the use of later statements that were lawful in themselves. Cf. also Embregts (2003, 148).

  50. 50.

    See Jörg (2010, note 9 to § 29).

  51. 51.

    Cf. on the historic background of § 29 CCP, Stevens (2005, 40–46).

  52. 52.

    See Lensing (1988, 39 et seq.), and Jörg (2010, note 9 to § 29).

  53. 53.

    For a detailed overview of the case law, see Jörg (2010, note 10 to § 29). See also Gerritsen (2000, 228–238).

  54. 54.

    HR May 13, 1997, Dutch Law Reports 1998, 152. The complaint to the ECHR that the method was in conflict with Art. 3 ECHR due to inhuman and degrading treatment was rejected by the ECtHR. Ebbinge v. Netherlands, No. 47240/99, ECHR, 14 March 2000.

  55. 55.

    HR June 10, 1980, Dutch Law Reports 1980, 591, HR 21 February 1989, Dutch Law Reports 1989, 668 and HR November 4, 2008, Dutch Law Reports 2008, 581.

  56. 56.

    HR September 22, 1998, Dutch Law Reports 1998, 104.

  57. 57.

    HR May 13, 1997, Dutch Law Reports 1998, 152. The central issue was whether the methods were so unlawful that the Public Prosecution Service should have been barred from prosecuting. According to the Supreme Court, that was not the case.

  58. 58.

    HR May 9, 2000, Dutch Law Reports 2000, 521.

  59. 59.

    HR March 12, 2002, LJN AD8906. An interesting question is the extent to which an accused is still free to choose his position and remain silent during lawful interrogations once he has confessed as a result of unlawful methods. See in that connection, Gäfgen v. Germany (G.C.)(2011), 52 E.H.R.R. 1, 37–38, §§ 147–149.

  60. 60.

    See Dubelaar (2009, 93). A good example of such a judgment is the judgment of the Breda District Court of March 2, 2009, LJN BH4358. Cf. Duker and Stevens (2009).

  61. 61.

    Jalloh v. Germany (G.C.)(2007), 44 E.H.R.R. 32, 667, 676, 679–680, §§ 40, 50, 51; Gäfgen v. Germany, 52 E.H.R.R. 1, 42, § 166.

  62. 62.

    Article 3 ECHR prohibits both torture and inhuman and degrading treatment.

  63. 63.

    Gäfgen v. Germany, 52 E.H.R.R. 1, 45, § 178.

  64. 64.

    Ibid.

  65. 65.

    The question whether the Schutznorm applies in cases of torture has not yet been brought up in European case law, nor, in general, has it been answered by the Court of Justice. Van Kempen is critical of this. See the annotation by P.H.P.H.M.C. van Kempen, Dutch Law Reports CM Bulletin 2007, p. 367.

  66. 66.

    See §§ 28(2), 50(1) CCP.

  67. 67.

    See § 40(2) CCP.

  68. 68.

    See in detail, Spronken (2001, 112–114, 223–235). See e.g. the conclusion of deputy A–G Bleichrodt for HR November 13, 2007, Dutch Law Reports 2008, 116.

  69. 69.

    About this debate, also for literature references, see, Stevens (2005, 62–64).

  70. 70.

    For instance, the lawyer must sit a small distance behind his client. The lawyer may not have eye contact with his client, may not say anything and will be removed from the interrogation room as soon as he interrupts the interrogation after being warned not to do so. See the protocol of the experiment on http://www.advocatenorde.nl/newsarchive/Protocol_Raadsman_politieverhoor.def.pdf.

  71. 71.

    See the Letter from the Minister of Justice, Parliamentary Papers II 2006–07, 30 800, VI, no. 86, section 4.

  72. 72.

    Salduz v. Turkey (G.C.) (2009), 49 E.H.R.R. 19, 421, 437, § 55; Panovits v. Cyprus, no. 4268/04, ECHR, 11 December 2008, § 76.

  73. 73.

    See for example, Spronken (2009, 94–100). See also Braanker (2009, 276–282). See also for a less far-reaching interpretation, also followed by the Minister and Supreme Court: Borgers (2009, 88–93).

  74. 74.

    See the letter from the Minister of April 15, 2009 on the presence of a lawyer during police interrogation, sections 4.3 and 5 (Parliamentary Papers II 2008/09, 31700 VI, no. 117) and HR June 30, 2009, Dutch Law Reports 2009, 349, 350, 351, with note by Schalken.

  75. 75.

    See e.g. HR June 30, 2009, LJN BH3081, legal ground 2.6.

  76. 76.

    Cf. HR November 13, 2007, Dutch Law Reports 2008, 116, in particular the note by Borgers. See also HR May 29, 1990, Dutch Law Reports 1990, 754 and HR 13 May 2006, Dutch Law Reports 2006, 369, in which the statement already did not qualify for exclusion because it was not plausible that the lack of legal assistance by a duty attorney influenced the contents of the statements made by the suspect. Because the suspect persisted in his confession, no causal connection could be shown.

  77. 77.

    HR June 30, 2009, Dutch Law Reports 2009, 349, 350, 351, legal ground 2.7.2.

  78. 78.

    The ECtHR also mentioned exclusion of evidence “as a rule”. Salduz v. Turkey (G.C.), 49 E.H.R.R. 19, 421, 437, § 55.

  79. 79.

    See for example HR January 17, 2012, National Case Law Number (LJN) BU4227, at www.rechtspraak.nl.

  80. 80.

    HR June 30, 2009, Dutch Law Reports 2009, 349, 350, 351, legal ground 2.7.3.

  81. 81.

    See for example HR January 26, 1988, Dutch Law Reports 1988, 818.

  82. 82.

    See HR October 22, 1991, Dutch Law Reports 1992, 218, legal ground 6.2, in which the Supreme Court used a broader causality requirement (“largely”). This is deemed to be restricted by the seminal judgment of 2004.

  83. 83.

    HR January 27, 2009, Dutch Law Reports 2009, 86 (retrial).

  84. 84.

    See e.g. Embregts (2003), and Van Woensel (2004).

  85. 85.

    One can, for that matter, put forth the same arguments to a certain extent for sentence reduction as a sanction, also the repercussions are less radical for the government.

  86. 86.

    See e.g. Corstens and Borgers (2011, 725–727), and Kuijper (2009).

  87. 87.

    Cf. Kuiper (2009, 52–53).

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Borgers, M.J., Stevens, L. (2013). The Netherlands: Statutory Balancing and a Choice of Remedies. In: Thaman, S. (eds) Exclusionary Rules in Comparative Law. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 20. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5348-8_8

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