Abstract
This final chapter attempts to synthesize the different approaches to exclusion of illegally gathered evidence reflected in the preceding chapters, and to formulate a theory of balancing of truth-finding in the criminal trial against the respect for fundamental human rights. Absolute exclusionary regimes included in constitutions, statutes, or even in decisions of high courts reflect a kind of “pre-balancing” which leaves the trial judge no option but to exclude. Thus would apply to statements or evidence issuing from torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, and in some countries, prima facie to constitutional violations affecting the right to counsel or wiretapping. Some jurisdictions, however, allow courts to determine whether a constitutional violation is “grave” and, if not, to then balance the violation against the seriousness of the charge before the court, or other interests. Many jurisdictions will also not exclude evidence even if it was the result of a violation of a fundamental right, if, after a balancing of the circumstances of the case show that the defendant was not deprived of a “fair trial”. The conclusion of the editor, is that courts are too willing to allow fundamental violation of human rights to be “balanced” away in favor of the search for truth, and that such balancing should be limited to situations where the violations are of subconstitutional legal rules. Courts should prima facie exclude evidence if there is a direct link between the evidence and a fundamental violation.
This chapter was originally published, except for some minor changes to bring it up to date, as “Constitutional Rights in the Balance: Modern Exclusionary Rules and the Toleration of Police Lawlessness in the Search for Truth” in University of Toronto Law Journal, Vol. 61, 692–735 (2011).
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
Also called “trial by battle” Bartlett (1986, 103).
- 5.
According to one Tibetan proverb: “[If the case is] clear, [decide it] by law; [if the case is] unclear, [decide it] by oath” French (1995, 132). Cf. Diamond (1971, 270). According to § 131 of the Code of Hammurabi, if a man accuses his wife of adultery, and she is not caught in flagrante, she can cleanse herself by oath VerSteeg (2002, 66).
- 6.
Ordeals were usually used in the absence of proof, but among some European tribes the ordeal was used to deter lying under oath Diamond (1971, 228, 296).
- 7.
- 8.
Customary law courts were often presided by a tribal chief, a king or heads of local communities, but leading members of local families had a right and duty to serve as members of the court, and anyone present could participate. These courts then gave way to trials by sworn neighbors in places as diverse as England and Ethiopia Diamond (1971, 273, 391).
- 9.
- 10.
- 11.
Ibid, 339,382. On criminal procedure of this epoch as a “science of horrors”, ibid, 578.
- 12.
On the conviction of the innocent, Beccaria (1764–1995, 62). La Bruyere once said: “Torture is a wonderful invention and may be counted upon to ruin an innocent person with a weak constitution and exonerate a guilty person born robust”. And further: “I might almost say in regard to myself, ‘I will not be a thief or a murderer’; but to say, ‘I shall not some day be punished as such’, would be to speak very boldly” Esmein (1913, 352, 380).
- 13.
Langbein (1977, 10).
- 14.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948).
- 15.
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ.T.S. No. 5; 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
- 16.
International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; S. Exec. Doc. E, 95–2 (1978); S. Treaty Doc. 95–20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967).
- 17.
American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 21, 1969, O.A.S. T.S. No. 36; 1144 U.N.T.S. 143; S. Treaty Doc. No. 95–21, 9 I.L.M. 99(1969).
- 18.
Blackstone’s Criminal Practice (2003, 1974).
- 19.
The most notorious of the dozens of cases decided in this area was Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), which involved the torture of Black suspects in a murder case and their hurried sentence to death 3 days later in a kangaroo jury court.
- 20.
The Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution reads: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.”
- 21.
Weeks v. United States, 232 US 383, 392 (l9l4). See also Cammack, Chap. 1, pp. 8–9.
- 22.
The Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution provides, inter alia, that: “No person…shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself”(…).
- 23.
The Sixth Amendment, provides, inter alia, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense”.
- 24.
From 1953 to 1969.
- 25.
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
- 26.
371 U.S. 471 (1963).
- 27.
The term “fruit of the poisonous tree” was originally coined by Justice Frankfurter in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939), but the idea that the government could not use derivative evidence was articulated 19 years earlier by Justice Holmes in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
- 28.
377 U.S. 201 (1964).
- 29.
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
- 30.
For more detail on the importance of these decisions, Cammack, Chap. 1, p. 1.
- 31.
Warren Burger was Chief Justice of the USSC from 1969 to 1986.
- 32.
First articulated in Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444–50 (1984).
- 33.
First articulated in Silverthorne Lumber Co. 251 U.S. 385, 392, but then reaffirmed in Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537–39 (1988).
- 34.
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918–25 (1984). For more on these exceptions, Cammack, Chap. 1, pp. 19–20.
- 35.
on how inquisitorial Europe developed “extrinsic” exclusionary rules relating to “values unrelated to the pursuit of truth” at a time when the Common law only knew “intrinsic” rules relating to the probative value of evidence Damaska (1997, 12–17).
- 36.
- 37.
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
- 38.
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003).
- 39.
Gopnik (2012, 73).
- 40.
Thaman (2010, 327–328).
- 41.
I disagree with the majority of the USSC when they intimate that improved police training, disciplinary regimes, and the possibility of civil suits, which were not available when Mapp v. Ohio was decided, might make the exclusionary rule no longer valid. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 597–599 (2006). The economic crisis has caused drastic cuts in the budgets of police departments (as well as public defender offices) which could lead to an actual decline in the quality of justice delivered both on the investigative and adjudicative end of criminal proceedings in the US. And violations of constitutional rights, such as failure to get a search warrant, are often just cost-cutting, and time-saving measures not linked to any true exigent circumstance.
- 42.
I will be largely ignoring another substantial area of exclusionary doctrine in the US relating to statements and physical evidence gathered as fruits of unlawful detentions or arrests.
- 43.
- 44.
Brazil also limits nullities to violations which infringe on the interests of the prosecution or the defense (§ 563 CCP-Brazil) or which impact on the ascertainment of the truth or the outcome of the trial (§ 566 CCP-Brazil). § 238 Ley del Poder Judicial (hereafter LOPJ-Spain), provides for a “nullity” when: “the essential rules of procedure are not respected and this may have caused an actual restriction of defense rights”. See Bachmaier, Chap. 9, p. 224.
- 45.
In systems where the written trial still dominates, such as in the Netherlands or the French trial in the correctional courts, the documents in the dossier could historically be read at the trial. This is now changing because the European Court of Human Rights (hereafter ECtHR), has held that the use of written statements may violate Art. 6(3)(d) ECHR, which guarantees the right to confrontation. See, inter alia, Delta v. France, 16 E.H.R.R. 574 (1993) and discussion in Thaman (2008, 125–135).
- 46.
For more on the French treatment of nullities, Pradel, Chap. 6, pp. 151–152.
- 47.
§§ 183, 184 CCP-Italy. For similar provisions, see § 171 CCP-Argentina-Federal; §§ 191, 195 CPP-Venezuela.
- 48.
§ 179 CCP-Italy. Cf. Illuminati, Chap. 10, p. 251.
- 49.
- 50.
For similar language, see § 573(1) CCP-Brazil; § 172 CCP-Argentina-Federal, and § 196(para.1)CCP-Venezuela.
- 51.
- 52.
- 53.
For a discussion, see Borgers and Stevens, Chap. 8, pp. 188–194.
- 54.
Art. 14(3)(g) ICCP; Art. 8(2)(g) ACHR. The ECHR recognized the right to silence as being part of the right to a fair trial guaranteed under Art. 6(1) ECHR. Murray v. United Kingdom (1996), 22 E.H.R.R. 29, 60.
- 55.
Art. 12 UDHR; Art. 17(1) ICCPR; Art. 8(1) ECHR; Art. 11(2) ACHR.
- 56.
Art. 12 UDHR prohibits “arbitrary” interference, Art. 17(1) ICCPR “arbitrary and unlawful” interference and Art. 11(2) ACHR, “arbitrary and abusive” interference.
- 57.
Art. 5 UDHR; Art. 7 ICCPR; Art. 3 ECHR; Art. 5(2) ACHR.
- 58.
Art. 4(2) ICCPR; Art. 15(3) ECHR.
- 59.
G.A. Resolution 39/46, Dec. 10, 1984, 39 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 51, at 197,U.N. Doc A/39/51. 146. http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg_no=IV-9&chapter=4&lang=en#Participants.
- 60.
Scharf (2008, 140).
- 61.
Ibid, 145.
- 62.
Gäfgen v. Germany (2011), 52 E.H.R.R. 1, 42 (§ 166). It appears here, that the ECtHR is treating the use of statements at trial, which were obtained as a result of the violation of Art. 3 ECHR as absolute reversible error, not subject to any “harmless error” analysis. US Courts would likely apply the doctrine of “harmless constitutional error” to such a situation, for so-called “structural errors”, which will constitute automatic reversible error, are usually not related to the erroneous admission of evidence, and thus are much like “nullities of general order” in civil law systems. On structural, and harmless constitutional error in the US, see LaFave et al. (2009, 1323–1331).
- 63.
Gäfgen, 52 E.H.R.R. 1, 42 (§§ 166–167).
- 64.
Ibid, 6–7, 9–10 (§§ 15–18, 29–21).
- 65.
Ibid, 44–46 (§§ 177–183).
- 66.
Ibid, 44 (§ 174).
- 67.
Ibid, § 175–176. For more on the Gäfgen case, Ölçer, Chap. 16, pp. 388–393.
- 68.
Similar rules are common in other modern CCP’s as well. Cf. § 64(3) CPP-Italy and § 9 CCP-Russia.
- 69.
Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897). See Cammack, Chap. 1, p. 22.
- 70.
For a summary of these “voluntariness” cases, see LaFave et al. (2009, 343–349).
- 71.
I am, of course, referring to the convoluted attempts by the USSC to characterize Mapp‘s Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule and Miranda’s Fifth Amendment exclusionary rule as “prophylactic” rules not required by the constitutional amendments they were originally designed to safeguard. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), in relation to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, and most recently United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 631 (2004), in relation to the Miranda rule.
- 72.
English translations of all world constitutions are available at constitutions of the countries of the world, http://www.oup.com/online/us/law/oceanalaw/?view=usa#ccwo (all constitutions will be referred to as Const.-).
- 73.
For similar language, see Art. 42(7) Const.-Georgia; Art. 71(3) Const.-Azerbaijan; Art. 27(2) Const.-Belarus; Art. 77(3)(9) Const.-Kazakhstan. § 75(1) CCP-Russia (2001), includes the same, broad, exclusionary mandate, as does § 105(4–5) CCP-Belarus; § 116(4) CCP-Kazakhstan; § 6(3) CCP-Kyrgyzstan; and § 125(4) CCP-Turkmenistan.
- 74.
Cf. § 38(para.8) Const.-Turkey and § 206(a)(2) CCP-Turkey, which use similar language.
- 75.
See Thaman (1995, 90–94), discussing exclusionary practices and criticism of the broad rule in jury trials in 1993–1994.
- 76.
For a US statutory exclusionary rule extending to non-constitutional statutory violations, see Vernon’s Ann. Texas C.C.P. § 38.23.
- 77.
Cf. § 136.4320 Or.Rev.Stats. which limits exclusion of evidence to situations when required by the constitutions of Oregon or the US.
- 78.
On the “totality of the circumstances” approach related to the admissibility of arguably “involuntary confessions”, LaFave et al. (2009, 343–349). In relation to determining “probable cause”, see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 267–274 (1983).
- 79.
BGHSt 38, 214, 218–222 (1992). English translation in Thaman (2008, 111).
- 80.
Triantafyllou, Chap. 11, pp. 288–290.
- 81.
Saltzburg and Capra (2010, 509).
- 82.
On the notion that “illicit evidence” is suppressible under § 11.1 LOPJ-Spain and that “irregular” evidence falls under § 238 LOPJ-Spain, the nullity provision, and does not lead to suppression of fruits of the violation, Aguilera Morales (2008, 93); Bachmaier, Ch. 9, p. 219.
- 83.
Supreme Court of Spain, Decision of July 9, 1993, English translation in Thaman (2008, 106–108).
- 84.
See the following two cases in which aspects of Fed. R. Crim. P. 41, regulating serving of search warrants, were violated: United States v. Schoenheit, 856 F.2d 74 (8th Cir. 1988) (violation of prohibition of night service); United States v. Charles, 883 F.2d 355 (5th Cir. 1989) (serving officer did not have warrant in hand).
- 85.
In relation to the wiretap statute, the provision must “directly and substantially implement” the congressional intention to restrict the use of electronic surveillance or be “intended to play a central role in the statutory scheme”. United States v. Giordano, 4 l6 U.S. 505, 527 (l974); United States v. Chavez, 4 l6 U.S. 562, 574 (l974).
- 86.
547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006).
- 87.
See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995). The court had to base its decision on the fact that the seizure of the evidence was not a “fruit” of the unlawful entry. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 586–587.
- 88.
Described as a “fair probability” that the thing searched for will be present in the indicated location. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238.
- 89.
On the near complete discretion of French judges to search any place and seize any thing that the judge deems “useful to the manifestation of the truth” Frase (2007, 210–211). On the low substantive barriers to searches in Germany, where mere “suspicion” is sufficient Weigend (2007, 249–250). For a Spanish investigating magistrate to order a search there need only be “indications” that the person or objects sought are located therein. § 546 CCP-Spain.
- 90.
Art. 13(2) Const.-Germany; Art. 14 Const.-Italy.
- 91.
Weigend (2007, 250), estimated that only 10 % of searches were conducted with warrants.
- 92.
In Germany and many other countries, police must acquire judicial validation of exigent searches within 2 or 3 days after the search. See § 98(2) CCP-Germany.
- 93.
In effect, only the most arbitrary searches ever led to exclusion of evidence Ransiek (2002, 566).
- 94.
BVerfGE 103, 142 (2001).
- 95.
An exception specifically included in Art. 18(2) Const.-Spain.
- 96.
18 U.S.C. § 2518(7)(a). The federal prosecutor must then request post factum approval of a judge within 48 h. Such immediate review after an emergency invasion of privacy is otherwise not required for emergency searches in the US.
- 97.
Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). I disagree with the USSC majority, however, and believe that such searches should not be used solely as pretexts for searches for evidence of crime.
- 98.
See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967).
- 99.
I thus disagree with the recent decision of the USSC in Kentucky v. King, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 1857–1862 (2011), which allows such creation of exigent circumstances.
- 100.
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918–925 (1984). See Cammack, Chap. 1, pp. 19–20.
- 101.
See People (A.G.) v. O’Brien [1965] I.R. 142, 160–161.
- 102.
People (D.P.P.) v. Kenny, [1990] 2 I.R. 110, 134; [1990] I.L.R.M. 569, 579. For a comprehensive discussion of the Irish cases and approach, Cras and Daley, Chap. 2, pp. 38–40.
- 103.
See United States v. Rice, 478 F.3d 704, 711–712 (6th Cir. 2007) which accepts no “good faith” exception to the wiretap exclusionary rule.
- 104.
In Leon, the USSC stated that the wrong perpetrated by the Fourth Amendment violation is “fully accomplished” at the time of the illegal search and no “new Fourth Amendment wrong” is perpetrated by admitting illegally seized evidence into the trial. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. at 906. The “fair trial” test of the ECtHR will be discussed, infra., and in detail in Ölčer, Chap. 16, p. 402.
- 105.
- 106.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
- 107.
384 U.S. at 477.
- 108.
- 109.
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225–226 (1971).
- 110.
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 438–439, 450 (1974).
- 111.
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437–438 (2000).
- 112.
United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 632 (2004).
- 113.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 492 (1964) This was also clearly reaffirmed in Florida v. Powell, 130 S.Ct. 1195, 1211 (2010).
- 114.
The Miranda court said it was not necessary to have a system of “station house lawyers” ready to advise incarcerated suspects, 384 U.S. at 474, as is required in England and Wales under the system of “duty solicitors”. Code of Practice (C) § 6.6 (a–c) Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (hereafter PACE-England and Wales).
- 115.
California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 361 (1981); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203–204 (1989).
- 116.
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422 (1986). The Court stated: “No doubt the additional information would have been useful to respondent; perhaps it even might have affected his decision to confess”.
- 117.
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988).
- 118.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 536–537 (White, dissenting).
- 119.
According to one study, only around one quarter of suspects elected to remain silent Leo (1996, 657–659).
- 120.
Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 129 S.Ct. 2079, 2085, 2089–2091 (2009).
- 121.
This provision was introduced due to the prevalent use of coercion by Russian criminal investigators, not only in inducing confessions, but also in inducing waivers of counsel prior to interrogation Thaman (2007, 375–378).
- 122.
See § 520(2)(a–c) CCP-Spain. See also De Urbano Castrillo, Torres Morato (2003, 78) and Bachmaier, ch. 9, p. 237.
- 123.
§§ 178(1)(c), 179 (1), 350(3) CCP-Italy, and discussion in Colamussi (1996, 37).
- 124.
§ 350(6,7) CCP-Italy.
- 125.
- 126.
Salduz v. Turkey (G.C.)(2009), 49 E.H.R.R. 19, 421, 435–439.
- 127.
Ibid, 438,§ 59.
- 128.
However, in a later case, the ECtHR held that Art. 6 ECHR had been violated in a case where the defendant signed a waiver of the right to counsel and confessed, because he credibly alleged that police had coerced him to waive the right. Oleg Kolesnik v. Ukraine, no. 17551/02, § 37, ECHR 2009.
- 129.
- 130.
Pishchalnikov v. Russia, no. 7025/04, §§ 76, 77, ECHR 2009. The ECtHR emphasized that defendant was questioned about grave crimes, such as murder, after having been arrested for another crime and that only with counsel could he have assessed the consequences of agreeing to the interrogation. ibid, § 80. On the contrary, the USSC recently ruled that an unequivocal waiver of Miranda rights, including the right to counsel, is no longer necessary, and may be inferred from the fact that the defendant eventually answers questions. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 2260–2262 (2010).
- 131.
Pishchalnikov v. Russia, no. 7025/04, § 79. The language seems plucked from Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981).
- 132.
Pishchalnikov v. Russia, no. 7025/04, §§ 81–82. Here the ECtHR makes a finding similar to that in Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 601 (2004), which held that a Miranda waiver after a preceding statement taken in willful violation of the Miranda rules could not be deemed to be knowing.
- 133.
Zaichenko v. Russia, no. 39660/02, § 38, ECHR 2010.
- 134.
In early March, 2011, the Belgian Senate approved a law providing for counsel before the first interrogation. Le Sénat adopte la loi Salduz: les droits des justiciables renforcés, rtbf.be.info, March 3, 2011, http://www.rtbf.be/info/belgique/detail_le-senat-adopte-la-loi-salduz-les-droits-du-justiciable-renforces?id=5714303; in France, the Conseil constitutionnel ordered in April 2011 that Salduz be implemented in France and lawyers stormed the jails demanding to represent their clients. Marion Isobel, Salduz fever sweeps Europe, blog open society, April 26, 2011, http://blog.soros.org/2011/04/case-watch-salduz-fever-sweeps-europe/. For the new sections implementing the right to counsel in France, see §§ 63-3-1, 63-4, 63-4-1, 63-4-2, added by Law 2011–392 of 14 April 2011.
- 135.
Salduz v. Turkey(G.C.)(2009), 49 E.H.R.R. 421, 436, § 52.
- 136.
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656 (1984).
- 137.
Gäfgen v. Germany (G.C.) (2011), 52 E.H.R.R. 1, 23, 27, §§ 87, 107.
- 138.
Allan v. United Kingdom (2003), 36 E.H.R.R. 12, 143, 155–156, § 42. The first important case taking this approach was Schenck v. Switzerland (1988), 13 E.H.R.R. 242, 264, § 46. To my knowledge, the ECtHR has never found a violation of the Art. 6 ECHR right to a fair trial based solely on the use of evidence seized in violation of the right to privacy under Art. 8 ECHR.
- 139.
- 140.
Ormerod (2003, 64).
- 141.
According to Andrew Ashworth, “if courts are allowed simply to pick and choose the guiding principle(s) in the circumstances of any individual case, there is unlikely to be a consistent approach and a danger of the question of admissibility being left to the ‘whim of the particular court’”. Cited in Duff (2004, 159).
- 142.
The New Zealand courts have rejected the deterrent rationale and focus exclusively on “vindication of the right” that has been breached, though they still engage in balancing Mahoney (2003, 610).
- 143.
Duff (2004, 160–174).
- 144.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
- 145.
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 (1984).
- 146.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Enacted by the Canada Act 1982 [U.K.] c.11; proclaimed in force April 17, 1982. Art. 35(5) Const.-South Africa, contains similar language, mandating exclusion if “the admission of that evidence would render the trial unfair or otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice” (Schwikkard, van der Merwe 2007, 487–488).
- 147.
Roach (2007, 71–72).
- 148.
See R. v. Grant, 2009 S.C. 32 §§ 95–97; R. v. Harrison, 2009 SC 34, § 2. For a positive assessment of this change, Stuart (2010, 316–319).
- 149.
See discussion in Wang, ch. 15, pp. 362–365.
- 150.
Lawrie v. Muir, 1950 JC 19, 26. See Stark and Leverick, Chap. 3, pp. 70–71.
- 151.
Duff (2004, 155), providing examples of this sort.
- 152.
Ridgeway v. the Queen, (1995) 184 C.L.R. 19, 38, cited in Bradley (2001, 380).
- 153.
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907–908 (1984).
- 154.
Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988).
- 155.
Herring v. United States. 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009).
- 156.
Ibid, 140.
- 157.
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006).
- 158.
Weigend (2007, 251).
- 159.
Bunning v. Cross, (1978) 141 C.L.R. 54, cited in Bradley (2001, 380).
- 160.
- 161.
STC 81/Feb. 4, 1998. Discussion in Bachmaier, Chap. 9, pp. 222–223.
- 162.
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, at 915–923.
- 163.
Massachusetts v. Shepard, 468 U.S. 981, 988–990 (1984), decided on the same day as Leon.
- 164.
Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1995).
- 165.
United States v. Herring, 555 U.S. 135, 137 (2009). For more on the “good faith” exception. Cammack, Chap. 1, pp. 19–20.
- 166.
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, at 914.
- 167.
The USSC recently recognized this exception in Davis v. United States, 131 S.Ct. 2419, 2428–2429 (2011).
- 168.
United States v. Herring, 555 U.S. at 153–154 (Ginsburg, dissenting).
- 169.
- 170.
STS 127/2004 of January 19, cited in Bachmaier, Chap. 9, pp. 222–223.
- 171.
The doctrine of “independent source” is applied in cases where there have been two searches, an illegal one and a legal one, independent of the illegality. It is applied, for instance, when police discover the presence of evidence illegally, but actually seize it pursuant to a search warrant based on information they possessed before the illegal search. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 805 (l984); Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988).
- 172.
This doctrine of “inevitable discovery” is applied where there is only one search and seizure, but other investigative procedures independent of the illegality would have discovered the evidence legally. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984). The Germans call this the “hypothetical independent source” or “hypothetical clean path” Weigend (2007, 253).
- 173.
United States v. Cabassa, 62 F.3d 470, 473 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Whitehorn, 829 F.2d 1225, 1232–1233 (2d Cir. 1987) (search warrant signed after the search); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011, 1013 (4th Cir. 1991).
- 174.
The overwhelming majority of US courts have rejected this argument, for it would make the warrant requirement meaningless. See e.g., United States v. Johnson, 22 F.3d 674, 680 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Echegoyen, 799 F.2d 1271, 1279 (9th Cir. 1986); State v. Handtmann, 437 N.W.2d 830, 838 (N.D. 1989); United States v. Brown, 64 F.3d 1083, 1085 (7th Cir. 1995).
- 175.
Ransiek (2002, 566). In 1989, the German Supreme Court held that the evidence found in an unconstitutional search will be admissible as long as it is otherwise legally seizable (i.e., is contraband, fruits, or instrumentalities of crime—and not a protected diary) and a judge would have issued a search warrant had the police sought one Weigend (2007, 252).
- 176.
- 177.
Decision of Italian Supreme Court of April 24, 1991, cited in Conso and Grevi (2002, 550).
- 178.
Decision No. 332/2001, Italian Constitutional Court, Gazzetta Ufficiale, n. 38 (Oct. 3, 2001). See Illuminati, ch.10, pp. 253–254 and Conso and Grevi (2002, 339).
- 179.
Fanuli (2004, 5–6).
- 180.
Ransiek (2002, 568). At least one section of the Italian Supreme Court has rejected the prevailing doctrine and recognizes a strict functional relationship between the act of searching and the seizure. Decision of March 13, 1992, cited in Conso, Grevi (2002, 550). See also Illuminati, Chap. 10, pp. 253–254.
- 181.
Weigend (2007, 253).
- 182.
Cordero (2000, 804).
- 183.
Conso, Grevi (2002, 399).
- 184.
See Gómez Colomer (1998, 162–163).
- 185.
STS 137/1999 of 8 Feburary, available at http://sentencias.juridicas.com/index.php.
- 186.
STC 81/1998, discussed in Bachmaier, Chap. 9, pp. 222–223.
- 187.
470 U.S. 298, 340 (1985).
- 188.
United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 632 (2004).
- 189.
Supporting this interpretation, LaFave et al. (2009, 543).
- 190.
18 U.S.C. § 6002. “The prosecution has a burden to prove the evidence it uses is derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled testimony”. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441,460 (1972).
- 191.
§ 76(5) PACE-England and Wales provides, albeit, that the jury shall not be told that the “facts” were derived from the statements of the defendant. Duff (2004, 152), alleges that there are no English cases upholding the suppression of physical evidence.
- 192.
Carrió, Garro (2007, 32–33).
- 193.
Di Palma (1996, 115).
- 194.
Weigend (2007, 261).
- 195.
Commonwealth v. Martin, 827 N.E.2d 198, 215 (Mass. 2005); State v. Knapp, 700 N.W.2d 899, 905–906 (Wis. 2005); State v. Peterson, 923 A.2d 585, 588–591 (Vt. 2007); State v. Vondehn, 236 P.3d 691, 695 (Or. 2010).
- 196.
Roach (2007, 75–77).
- 197.
Ibid, 71.
- 198.
See R v. Grant [2009] SCC 32, § 16, where the court balanced a non-egregious unlawful detention and questioning, by virtue of which the defendant was “conscripted” to admit possession of a gun, against the importance of the rights impinged on thereby, and the importance of the physical evidence to determine the truth of the charges, and admitted the gun.
- 199.
Shaheed [2002] 2 N.Z.L.R. 377, CA , cited in Mahoney (2003, 607).
- 200.
Bunning v. Cross, [1978] 141 C.L.R. 54, cited in Bradley (2001, 380).
- 201.
Art. 2(1) Const-Germany
- 202.
See Decision of German Supreme Court of Feb. 21, 1964, BGHSt 19, 325, 326–328 (1964), English translation in Thaman (2008, 82).
- 203.
See Decision of German Supreme Court of June 14, 1960, BGHSt 14, 358, 359–360, 364–365 (1960), English translation in Thaman (2008, 72–73).
- 204.
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 309–310 (1967).
- 205.
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 628 (1886); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391–392 (1914).
- 206.
116 U.S. at 633. Note the similarity with the now outdated Canadian exclusionary rule based on constitutional violations which “conscript” the defendant to give evidence against himself. For a similar comparison of a subpoena duces tecum with an involuntary confession, see Beling (1903, 14).
- 207.
On the distinction between Beweiserhebungsverbot (evidentiary gathering prohibition) and Beweisverwertungsverbot (evidentiary use-prohibition), Roxin (1995, 164).
- 208.
Hopt v. Territory of Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 585 (1884).
- 209.
Fed. Rule of Evidence 403, § 352 Cal. Evidence Code.
- 210.
§ 105 CCP-Armenia. Similar language is used in § 125(2)(1) CCP-Azerbaijan; § 94(2) CCP-Moldova; and § 125 CCP-Turkmenistan.
- 211.
United Nations, IT/32/Rev.40, July 12, 2007.
- 212.
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. July 17, 1998. U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess, U.N. Doc.A/CONF. 183/9 (1998).
- 213.
This rationalization is employed in South Africa, Schwikkard, van der Merwe (2007, 488).
- 214.
Beling (1903, 35).
- 215.
Thus, the German Supreme Court allowed use of a diary in a brutal rape-murder case, but not in a perjury case. Thaman (2008, 113).
- 216.
- 217.
This is allowed under § 359a CCP-Netherlands, and suggested by some U.S. commentators. See Calabresi (2003, 116).
- 218.
Thaman (2003, 314).
- 219.
See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 598–599 (2006).
- 220.
United States v. Herring, 555 U.S. 135, 137–138 (2009), noting that the reason for stopping the defendant was that he was “no stranger to law enforcement”.
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Thaman, S.C. (2013). Balancing Truth Against Human Rights: A Theory of Modern Exclusionary Rules. In: Thaman, S. (eds) Exclusionary Rules in Comparative Law. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 20. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5348-8_17
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