Abstract
In this contribution, we explore whether the ICE-theory of technical functions can be used to formulate a unified account of functional discourse in biology and other functional domains. We discern three routes for arriving at a unified account: literally applying the ICE-theory to the other functional domains, taking non-technical functions as ‘as-if’ ICE-technical-functions, and generalising the ICE-theory to the other domains. We argue that the first and second routes are rather unattractive; the ICE-theory presupposes descriptions of using and designing that cannot be literally applied to biology without counterintuitive results. The third route towards unification leads to a unified ICE-like function theory, but one that calls for reservation. The unified ICE-like function presents a general understanding of functional descriptions as descriptions of items by which agents are epistemically highlighting the capacities that explain (successful) realisations of goal-directed patterns designated by (other) agents. Yet this understanding contradicts the usual view that biological functions are features that biological items have independently of any goal-directed patterns designated by agents.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
Function ascriptions by physicians to placebos do not satisfy condition I, the ascription of the function to bring luck to old horseshoes typically does not satisfy condition C, and condition E is not satisfied when one ascribes to light switches the function to detonate accidental spills of gas.
- 3.
This plan relativity of function ascriptions shows our commitment to an action-theoretic description of use and design. On it, function ascriptions presuppose a rather complicated mental state, more complicated at any rate than states such as ‘intending’ (conceived as some combination of desiring and believing).
- 4.
An observer who identifies an artefact’s capacity to φ as one that contributes to realising a goal, and who assumes that it has been deliberately designed or used for realising that goal, need not always have the two beliefs required by condition I. She/he may, for instance, think that these beliefs are unjustifiable. Take an observer who considers old horseshoes, which are supposed to have the capacity to bring luck. If the observer does not believe her/himself that horseshoes have this capacity, but still ascribes this capacity as a function to the horseshoes, this counts on the ICE-theory as an ungrounded function ascription. The observer can, however, still claim that the people that proposed the ‘luck-bringing’ use plan for horseshoes, or those that carry out this plan, ascribe the mentioned function to the shoes.
- 5.
A more extensive argument that the ICE-theory is meeting these desiderata is given in Houkes and Vermaas (2010).
- 6.
One illustration that a failure to execute of a use plan need not imply that the relevant artefact lacks the capacity to let this execution be successful is a car with an empty gas tank: that car still has the capacity to drive, although manipulating it by the use plan will lead nowhere. See Houkes and Vermaas (2010) for further argumentation along this line.
- 7.
The question of whether there exists a theory of technical functions that is compatible with the ICE-theory and that can be taken as an ontological function theory is considered in Vermaas (2009). In Houkes and Vermaas (2004), it is argued that, on such an ontological counterpart of the ICE-theory, technical functions cannot be interpreted as essential properties of artefacts.
- 8.
McLaughlin (2001, ch. 7) rejects the analogy between function ascriptions to artefacts and biological items by arguing that artefacts and organisms are associated with different goals, and that designing differs from natural selection. The position that function ascriptions to artefacts presuppose an action-theoretical background that is absent in biology may be taken as a third argument.
- 9.
Biological items that are the result of human interferences with biological organisms, ranging from breeding to genetic engineering may be taken as belonging to both the biological and technical domain. Functional descriptions of these hybrid items are ignored here in order to focus on purely biological cases.
- 10.
On the action-theoretical description presupposed by the ICE-theory, the use plan developed for a technical component is primarily developed for and communicated to other designers, who can use the components for designing artefacts according to their own use plans (Vermaas 2006). In the main text, this description of component designing is exported to the liver: as an organ, it is the counterpart of a technical component, rather than a whole artefact.
- 11.
Ulrich Krohs (2009) introduces a generalised concept of design that also makes sense in biology. This generalised concept is, however, not action-theoretical: Krohs’ concept of design does not refer to the process of designing but exclusively to the end result of that process. Moreover, Krohs does not introduce equally generalised concepts of using and communication.
- 12.
It can also be argued that the bio-ICE-theory meets a biological innovation desideratum. But due to the relatively slow development of new biological patterns, the concept of an ‘innovative biological item’ may not be a relevant one in biology, taking away a basis for introducing this desideratum as a necessary condition for theories of biological functions.
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Acknowledgement
Research by Pieter Vermaas and research by Wybo Houkes was supported by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO).
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Vermaas, P.E., Houkes, W. (2013). Functions as Epistemic Highlighters: An Engineering Account of Technical, Biological and Other Functions. In: Huneman, P. (eds) Functions: selection and mechanisms. Synthese Library, vol 363. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5304-4_11
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