Instrumental Artefact Functions and Normativity

  • Jesse Hughes
Part of the Philosophy of Engineering and Technology book series (POET, volume 9)


Artifacts are inherently practical things, intended to be used to achieve certain kinds of ends. This is, after all, what we mean when we speak about artifactual functions that things of this sort are good for something or, to put the matter differently, that things of this sort are good for something—that is, that the function bearer is good at achieving certain related classes of ends. To possess a function is to be suited for certain specified things.


Instrumental Function Normal Token Artefact Type Functional Goal Functional Knowledge 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Bentley UniversityWalthamUSA

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