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Non-proxy Reductions of Eternalist Discourse

  • Fabrice Correia
Chapter
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 361)

Abstract

Eternalists believe that there are past things and future things which are not present. In contrast, presentists hold that only present objects exist. In this chapter, I discuss presentist reductions of eternalist discourse which do not involve quantification over proxies—i.e. presentistically acceptable surrogates for merely past and merely future entities.

Keywords

Home Language Existential Quantifier Presentist View Translation Scheme Priorean Operator 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of GenevaGenevaSwitzerland

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