The Truth About the Past and the Future

  • Ned Markosian
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 361)


This chapter is about The Truthmaker Problem for Presentism. I spell out a solution to the problem that involves appealing to indeterministic laws of nature and branching semantics for past- and future-tensed sentences. Then I discuss a potential glitch for this solution, and propose a way to get around that glitch. Finally, I consider some likely objections to the view offered here, as well as replies to those objections.


Tense Operator Current Arrangement Standard Semantic Tense Logic Singular Proposition 
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Earlier versions of this material were presented at the University of Leeds and the University of Sydney in 2005. I am grateful to both audiences for helpful discussions. Also, the core ideas of this paper appeared in my 1990 doctoral dissertation at the University of Massachusetts. I am grateful to the members of my dissertation committee – Gary Matthews, Fred Feldman, Ed Gettier, and Angelika Kratzer – and also to David Cowles, Cranston Paull, Tom Ryckman, and Ted Sider for helpful discussions. I am also grateful to Andrea Borghini, Giuliano Torrengo, and an anonymous referee for comments on the penultimate draft.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyWestern Washington UniversityBellinghamUSA

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