The Metaphysics of the Thin Red Line

Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 361)


The thin red line is the view that time branches towards the future, but future contingent has already in the present a determinate truth-value. On the face of it, such a view avoids determinism and fatalism, while also representing the fact that there is a future which is ‘special’ because it is the one that will be the case. However, many have objected to the tenability of the thin red line theory by arguing that either it collapses on linear time or it compels us to endorse thick metaphysical theses about the future. In this chapter, we argue against such attacks and show that TRL’s metaphysical grounds are solid.


Branching time theory Thin red line Metaphysics of the thin red line 


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© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyCollege of the Holy CrossWorcesterUSA
  2. 2.Departament de Lògica, Història i Filosofia de la CiènciaUniversitat de BarcelonaBarcelonaSpain

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