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Branching Time and Temporal Unity

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Around the Tree

Part of the book series: Synthese Library ((SYLI,volume 361))

Abstract

In this chapter, it is argued that an important condition on the unity of time excludes the possibility of branching time. The condition in question is that two moments of time can belong to the same time series only if, for each moment that lies between them, at least one simple substance persists through that moment. Since simple substances, by definition, cannot divide, it appears that time could not branch at any particular moment, contrary to a core assumption of theories of branching time.

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References

  • Lowe, E.J. 1998. The possibility of metaphysics: Substance, identity, and time. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Andrea Iacona for insightful and helpful comments on an earlier draft of this chapter.

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Correspondence to E. J. Lowe .

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© 2013 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Lowe, E.J. (2013). Branching Time and Temporal Unity. In: Correia, F., Iacona, A. (eds) Around the Tree. Synthese Library, vol 361. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5167-5_4

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