Ecology and Moral Ontology

Abstract

The “superorganism” was the first paradigm in ecology, set out by Drude in Europe and Clements in North America. It was succeeded by the “ecosystem” paradigm, set out by Tansley, developed by Lindeman and consolidated by Odum, who, at the mid­point of the twentieth century, returned it to its superorganismic roots. The analogy of ecosystems to organisms could not withstand subsequent scientific scrutiny: ecosystems are too ill­bounded, porous, dynamic and artificial to be sufficiently like organisms to qualify as superorganisms. The reverse analogy – organisms to ecosystems – is more perfect. Humans and other organisms may be fruitfully conceived as superecosystems. One’s very cells host mutualistic mitochondrial organelles; one’s gut hosts a huge biodiversity of bacteria, as do the surface areas of one’s body. In addition to the resident biota, abiotic materials (air, water, various nutrients) flow through oneself. This superecosystemic conception of oneself implies a relational – as opposed to a monadic – moral ontology. One’s relationships – to other humans, to various kinds of animals, to one’s various social and biotic communities, to the biosphere – generate a set of nuanced duties and obligations. One discharges such duties and obligations in a spirit of affection and pride, not in a spirit of begrudging self-sacrifice.