Primordial Sense-Perception

Cairns, Dorion; Embree, Lester

doi:10.1007/978-94-007-5043-2_13

Dorion Cairns &
Lester Embree³

Part of the book series: Phaenomenologica ((PHAE,volume 207))

1616 Accesses

Abstract

The object of primordial sense perception is without cultural sense or animateness and can serve as clue to its constitution. It is in a conexus containing fluids as well as solids and also gases and a material ontology of nature could be developed but is not here. In general, it temporally endures, has spatial extendedness, and is at rest or in motion in world space. It has an inside and an outside and also texture, taste, odor, etc. and is in causal-functional relations with other such things. But it is not yet categorially formed or objectivated. Noematically it has its objective sense and manner of givenness and thus a core, some emptily as well as fully intended, there is thetic quality such that perceiving is believing, there is attending, and there are horizons of recollecting and potential intending and a genetic horizon for how the sense has been transferred.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution

Chapter: USD 29.95; Price excludes VAT (USA)

eBook: USD 84.99; Price excludes VAT (USA)

Softcover Book: USD 109.99; Price excludes VAT (USA)

Hardcover Book: USD 109.99; Price excludes VAT (USA)

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

1.
Here again, language forces us to speak of “portion,” to use an ontological concept, though we wish to speak of the noematic sense. The grasping of an object which is a “part” of the thing and correlatively, the positing of the thing as a “whole” are higher, founded acts. (Cf. Chaps. 6 and 18).
2.
Cf. Chap. 3, pp. 31f.
3.
Cf. pp. 32.
4.
Cf. pp. 41ff.
5.
Cf. Chap. 3, pp. 35f.
6.
Cf. pp. 35f.
7.
Cf. pp. Chap. 6, also 197ff.
8.
Cf. Chap. 5, also pp. 22 and 38.
9.
Cf. Chap. 7, pp. 73–75, also p. 22.
10.
In both senses of the word. Cf. pp. 31ff.
11.
Cf. Chap. 7, pp. 73–75.
12.
Cf. Chaps. 4 and 10, pp. 41–50, and 95–99.
13.
Cf. Chap. 5, pp. 51–55, also p. 22.
14.
Cf. loc cit.
15.
Cf. loc cit.
16.
Cf. pp. 88ff.
17.
See Chapter for detailed analysis. [Cairns marked this note for deletion.–L.E.]
18.
Cf. pp. 73–75.
19.
The analogy is the author’s.
20.
Cf. pp. 24f.
21.
Cf. Chap. 6, pp. 62ff.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Schmidt College of Arts and Letters, Florida Atlantic University, 33431, Boca Raton, FL, USA
Lester Embree

Authors

Dorion Cairns
View author publications
You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar
Lester Embree
View author publications
You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

, Schmidt College of Arts and Letters, Florida Atlantic University, 777 Glades Rd, Boca Raton, 33431, Florida, USA
Lester Embree

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Cairns, D., Embree, L. (2013). Primordial Sense-Perception. In: Embree, L. (eds) The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl. Phaenomenologica, vol 207. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5043-2_13

Download citation

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5043-2_13
Published: 15 August 2012
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-007-5042-5
Online ISBN: 978-94-007-5043-2
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics