Abstract
When the higher and cultural strata of worldly objects is abstracted from, they are still posited in intersubjective syntheses. By another abstractive epochē the world sense remains intended in my transcendental consciousness but not intended by transcendental others although they along with worldly objects remain objects for me. Egological constitutional analysis can then be performed on one’s own body as well as all else.
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Notes
- 1.
Cf. Chap. 11, p. 103.
- 2.
An explicit statement of the theory of negative cultural determinations has not been found by the author in Husserl’s statements. It is, however, not merely a phenomenological fact but a necessary consequence of Husserl’s theory of association and apperception. It is theoretically important, because it brings out the universality of the “cultural,” i.e., axiotic and teleological, stratum of the world-sense.
- 3.
The explicit statement that either a positive or a negative psycho-physical sense is part of the sense of all world things has not been found in Husserl, though the reasons for believing he would accept this theory are even stronger than the reasons for believing he would accept the view that all things have either a positive or a negative cultural sense.
- 4.
Cf. Chap. 27.
- 5.
Cf. Chap. 26.
- 6.
The emptily positable pure “possibility” of a mind in the world, but lacking all positive determination as connected with a body, is, as we shall see later an evident pure impossibility. To be in the world, a spirit must be embodied in the world (Cf. pp. 285–297).
- 7.
We shall adopt this shorter term, but must bear in mind that the purely natural “object,” devoid of positive or negative cultural or “animal” determination is an abstraction.
- 8.
Cf. p. 7.
- 9.
Cf. pp. 92f.
- 10.
There is a question mark in the left margin at this point.—L.E.
- 11.
For the following roughly dozen instances where the word “egological” is found, Cairns wrote above it “primordial.” It would seem that the intent is to replace “egological” with “primordial.” Both are included in each case here as “[primordial or] egological.”—L.E.
- 12.
There is a question mark in the left margin at this point.—L.E.
- 13.
There is a question mark in the left margin at this point.—L.E.
- 14.
Cf. p. 111.
- 15.
Primordial Egological time, the time-form of the primordial egological world, is different not only from the time-form of the intersubjective world, but also from the time-form of transcendental consciousness, transcendental time.
- 16.
Here Cairns actually indicates that “egological” needs to be deleted and replaced with “primordial.”—L.E.
- 17.
Cf. Chap. 9.
- 18.
Cf. Chap. 11, p. 103.
- 19.
We shall see that the motivational connection between the act of volition and the realization of a state of rest or motion in the body is not, strictly speaking, direct. That which the will controls directly is the realization of habitually familiar typical sequences of kinaesthesia. The functional connection of a typical kinaesthetic process with a corresponding type of sensuously perceived movement of the body is also a matter of habitual familiarity, part of the permanent “style” of constitutive consciousness—not a necessary, but an “inductive” affair. (Cf. Chap. 16, pp. 173ff.). But it remains true that the connection between volition and organ movement is more nearly direct than is that between volition and movement of some thing outside the organism.
- 20.
The mention of kinaesthesia and hyletic unities is an anticipation, for the sake of avoiding an obvious incompleteness in the enumeration of facts determining the unique sense of the body in the primordial world. For definitions and analyses of kinaesthesia and hyle see Chap. 14 et sequa.
- 21.
Cf. pp. . Cairns does not include page numbers in this note.—L.E.
- 22.
Cf. Chap. 6, pp. 57ff.
- 23.
Cf. Chap. 11.
- 24.
Cf. Chap. 6.
- 25.
Cf. Chap. 9.
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Cairns, D., Embree, L. (2013). The Egological Reduction. In: Embree, L. (eds) The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl. Phaenomenologica, vol 207. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5043-2_12
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