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Appendix Four: Moral Necessity in Leibniz

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The Impossibility and Necessity of Theodicy

Part of the book series: Studies in German Idealism ((SIGI,volume 14))

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Abstract

In Appendix Four the author present further considerations on the meaning of some essential concepts: namely, possibility and contingency, hypothetical and moral necessity.

Original Italian edition: La necessità morale in Leibniz, in “Paradigmi,” XVII (1999), n.51, pp.473–490.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    T 219/236; cf. T 182/201, 319/332, 338/350, 386/387; GP VII 390 (Eng. trans. L-C 57); cf. also GRUA 289.

  2. 2.

    T 37/61; cf. GP III 401(Eng. trans. Phil. Ess. 193).

  3. 3.

    Cf. T 37/61.

  4. 4.

    Cf. T 33/57.

  5. 5.

    Cf. T 37/61, 380/381, 386/387.

  6. 6.

    Cf. T 380/381, 386/387, 390/395, 412/417.

  7. 7.

    T 296/310.

  8. 8.

    T 338/350.

  9. 9.

    Cf. T 215 ff./233 f.

  10. 10.

    Cf. T 217/234 f.

  11. 11.

    GP II 563; cfr. IV 283 (Eng. trans. PhPL 273), 288 f., 299 (Eng. trans. Phil. Ess. 242), 340 f.; VII 334 (Eng. trans. Phil. Ess. 282).

  12. 12.

    Cf. L. VALLA, Dialogo intorno al libero arbitrio, cit., p. 267. Cf. T 359/484. For an expression of Leibniz’s appreciation of Valla, cf. T 43/67. For the Leibnizian reworking of the myth of Sextus Tarquinius, cf. T 357 ff./365 ff.

  13. 13.

    Cf. T 211 ff./229 ff.

  14. 14.

    T 217/235.

  15. 15.

    T 217 f./235.

  16. 16.

    T 218/235 f.

  17. 17.

    T 211/229.

  18. 18.

    T 311/324.

  19. 19.

    This conception of the possibles is the basis for the critique of the best of all possible worlds theory formulated by V. MATHIEU in his study on L’equivoco dell’incompossibilità e il problema del virtuale, cit.

  20. 20.

    T 123/143.

  21. 21.

    T 123/143 f.

  22. 22.

    Cf. ibidem.

  23. 23.

    T 127/147.

  24. 24.

    Cf. GP II 11 ff., in particular 11–59 (Eng. trans. L-A 11–66).

  25. 25.

    Cfr. GP II 15, 17, 18, 27, passim (Eng. trans L-A 9, 12, 13, 26).

  26. 26.

    GP II 55 (Eng. trans. L-A 62); cf. 42 (Eng. trans. L-A 46).

  27. 27.

    Cf. GP II 49 (Eng. trans. L-A 54 f.).

  28. 28.

    GP II 56 f. (Eng. trans. L-A 63 f.).

  29. 29.

    In the light of the above quoted passage, we might also read following passage in the same sense: “Therefore, the predicate or consequent is always in the subject or antecedent, and the nature of truth in general or the connection between the terms of a statement, consists in this very thing, as Aristotle also observed. The connection and inclusion of the predicate in the subject is explicit in identities, but in all other propositions it is implicit and must be shown through the analysis of notions; a priori demonstration rests on this” (COUT 518 f.; Eng. trans. Phil. Ess. 31). I have already briefly discussed the approaches of other scholars to the identification of the reason principle with the principle “praedicatum inest subjecto” and its implications above, Chap. 7, note 52.

  30. 30.

    GP II 56; Eng. trans. L-A 62. Italics mine.

  31. 31.

    GP IV 433; Eng. trans. Phil. Ess. 41.

  32. 32.

    FdCNL 181 f.; Eng. trans. Phil. Ess. 95 f.

  33. 33.

    But also elsewhere: cf., for example, COUT 18.

  34. 34.

    Cf. FdCNL 179 f. (Eng. trans. Phil. Ess. 95).

  35. 35.

    I am here summarising the key points discussed in more depth in Appendix One of Chap. 9.

  36. 36.

    GM VII 53. In line with the considerations here being made, it is fitting to refer to Leibniz’s contributions to the logic of probability. I will here limit myself to highlighting its importance. The Italian scholar, L. CATALDI MADONNA, in his study on Gewissheit, Wahrscheinlichkeit und Wissenschaft in der Philosophie von Leibniz, in “Aufklärung,” V/2, 1990, pp. 103–115, clearly outlines how Leibniz’s reflection on probability, through an obјectivization and a mathematicisation of his concept, which posits probability in continuity with certainty, ultimately makes probability a degree of certainty (on the important precedent for this in the Logique of Port-Royal, cf. IDEM, La filosofia della probabilità nel pensiero moderno. Dalla Logique di Port-Royal a Kant, Cadmo, Roma 1988 pp. 17 ff.). Probability, then, is, for Leibniz, “a fitting means (…) for bridging the gap between the realms of necessity and contingency” (p.110). Some years before Cataldi’s study, B. LEONI, in a famous and significant essay entitled Probabilità e diritto nel pensiero di Leibniz, in “Rivista di Filosofia,” 38 (1947), pp. 65–95, had already written on this matter, with particular reference to its legal implications.

  37. 37.

    Of the many pertinent passages, cf. for example, FdCNL 184 [Eng. trans. Phil. Ess. 97]; COUT 1 ss. [Eng. trans. Phil. Ess. 98 ff.], 18, 388 f. [Eng. trans. LP 77 f.].

  38. 38.

    T 123/143 f.

  39. 39.

    T 300/313.

  40. 40.

    Cf. G.W. LEIBNIZ, Elementa juris naturalis, in A VI/1 466.

  41. 41.

    B. RUSSELL, op. cit., p. 27.

  42. 42.

    Cf. Sophist 247 d-e.

  43. 43.

    On this point cf. H. POSER, Zur Theorie der Modalbegriffe bei G.W. Leibniz, cit., pp. 36 note, 44, and the passages in Leibniz there indicated.

  44. 44.

    B. RUSSELL, op. cit.,p. 26.

  45. 45.

    Cf. ibi, pp. 27 ff.

  46. 46.

    Ibi, p. 36; cf. pp. 26 f.

  47. 47.

    See above, Chap. 7, note 38.

  48. 48.

    GP VII 304; Eng. trans. Phil. Ess. 151. I dwell on the importance of this meaning of the reason principle in Chap. 7 above.

  49. 49.

    Lexicon Philosophicum secundum curis Stephani Chauvini, Leovardiae 1713, p. 435.

  50. 50.

    Cf. J. H. ZEDLER, Grosses Vollständiges Universal-Lexikon, Bd. 35, Leipzig und Halle, 1743; facsimile edition Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt, Graz 1961, col. 4.

  51. 51.

    J. H. ZEDLER, Grosses Vollständiges Universal-Lexicon, Bd. 37, Leipzig und Halle, 1743; facsimile edition cit, 1962, col. 1867.

  52. 52.

    T 390/395.

  53. 53.

    Ibidem.

  54. 54.

    T 50/74.

  55. 55.

    GP II 38 (Eng. trans L-A 40). In the letter to Des Bosses of 16 Јune 1712, in reference to the Theodicy, Leibniz writes: “Indeed, in my little essay, I explained physical necessity as a consequence of moral necessity” (GP II 450; cf. 456).

  56. 56.

    Cf. GP II 40, 49, 51 (Eng. trans L-A 43, 54 f., 56 f.).

  57. 57.

    GP II 42 (Eng. trans. L-A 46).

  58. 58.

    V. MATHIEU, Die drei Stufen des Weltbegriffes bei Leibniz, cit.

  59. 59.

    Cf. ibi, pp. 20–21.

  60. 60.

    Ibi, pp. 21 s.

  61. 61.

    As the already cited and much earlier article by Mathieu, L’equivoco dell’incompossibilità e il problema del virtuale,might already lead us to believe.

  62. 62.

    Cf. GP II 45, 54 s. [Eng. trans. L-A 49 f., 60 ff.], where Leibniz responds to an obјection by Arnauld (cf. GP II 32 [Eng. trans. L-A 31 f.]), to which Mathieu appears to make implicit reference in his L’equivoco dell’incompossibilità e il problema del virtuale, cit., p. 223.

  63. 63.

    Cf. T 363 f./372.

  64. 64.

    T 50/74.

  65. 65.

    T 236/253.

  66. 66.

    GP VII 304; Eng. trans. Phil. Ess. 151.

  67. 67.

    GP VII 289.

  68. 68.

    GP VII 305; Eng. transl. Phil. Ess. 152.

  69. 69.

    To give јust one example, I will here quote the Monadology: “It is also true that God is not only the source of existences, but also that of essences insofar as they are real, that is, of the source of that which is real in possibility. This is because God’s understanding is realm of eternal truths or that of ideas on which they depend; without him there would be nothing real in possibles, and not only would nothing exist, but also nothing would be possible” (GP VI 614; Eng. trans. Phil. Ess. 218). I would also, at this point, quote the Causa Dei asserta per justitiam ejus: “[…] The dependence of things on God” extends both to all the possibles, i.e. to all that which does not imply contradiction, and to all actual things.

    […] The very possibility of things, even if they do not exist in actuality, is really founded in divine existence, since if God did not exist nothing would even be possible, whilst possibles are as ideas in the intellect of God for all eternity” (GP VI 439 f.).

  70. 70.

    Cf. above, Chap. 7, Sect. 5.

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    Andrea Poma

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Poma, A. (2012). Appendix Four: Moral Necessity in Leibniz. In: The Impossibility and Necessity of Theodicy. Studies in German Idealism, vol 14. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5031-9_12

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