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Sense and Nonsense About Austin’s Jurisprudence from a Scandinavian Perspective

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The Legacy of John Austin's Jurisprudence

Part of the book series: Law and Philosophy Library ((LAPS,volume 103))

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Abstract

This chapter presents a critical account of the views of the Scandinavian Realists of John Austin’s jurisprudence. The Dane Alf Ross has a favourable view of Austin’s methodological approach that restricts law to positive law to be defined in terms of commands passed by the sovereign, although Ross objects that it is a mistake to locate the sovereign outside the law. Ross also lauds Austin for his distinction between the existence of a law and its merit, leading to different inquiries into the law, although Ross rejects Austin’s inquiry into the merit of the positive law based upon the principle of utility as superficial and without any interests for lawyers. By contrast, the Swedes have a negative view of Austin’s jurisprudence. Thus Hägerström holds that it is impossible to define the positive law in terms of the will, and the model for Austin’s theory is pure despotism. Lundstedt follows suit and claims that Austin’s jurisprudence is devoid of any meaning. Olivecrona endorses Austin’s view that the concept of command is important for the analysis of the concept of law, but he rejects Austin’s analysis to arrive at the view that a positive law is an independent imperative that does not express any personal will but regulates the use of force. Ross follows Olivecrona’s analysis but prefers to use the technical term directive that is defined as utterances with no representative meaning but with intent to exercise influence. Thus legal rules are used by the legal officials to cause the appropriate behaviour among people as the effect and this implies that the positive law has a place in the world as a link in the chain of cause and effect. However another implication of the Scandinavian view is that legal rules are devoid of any conceptual meaning which is tantamount to legal nihilism and the related view that there is no legal knowledge which is legal scepticism.

This is a revised version of my paper presented at the conference John Austin and His Legacy organised by Professor Michael Freeman of the UCL Faculty of Laws, London 16th–17th December 2009. I wish to thank Michael Freeman for the invitation and Cassel Stiftelsen, Faculty of Law, Stockholm University for financial assistance.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Jes Bjarup, “The Philosophy of Scandinavian Legal Realism” (2005) 18 Ratio Juris 1–15 for an overview.

  2. 2.

    I draw upon my chapter “Alf Ross” in Der Kreis um Hans Kelsen. Die Anfangsjahre der Reinen Rechtslehre ed. by Robert Walter, Clemens Jabloner, Klaus Zeleny (Schriftenreihe des Hans Kelsen-Instituts, Wien: Manz, 2008) at 409–443.

  3. 3.

    Alf Ross, Theorie der Rechtsquellen. Ein Beitrag zur Theorie des positiven Rechts auf Grundlage dogmenhistorischer Untersuchungen, in the book series Wiener Staats- u. Rechtswissenschaftlichen Studien (Band 13) ed. by Hans Kelsen (Deuticke: Leipzig/Wien, 1929).

  4. 4.

    Ross, Theorie der Rechtsquellen, supra note 3 at 3; cf. 50.

  5. 5.

    John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence, or The Philosophy of Positive Law ed. by Robert Campbell (4th edition, rev., London: John Murray, 1873) [Bristol: Thoemmes Press reprint, 2002], Lecture I, vol. I, 88.

  6. 6.

    Ross, Theorie der Rechtsquellen, supra note 3 at 79; cf. 87.

  7. 7.

    John Stuart Mill, “Austin on Jurisprudence” printed in (October 1863) 118 Edinburgh Review, 439–482 [reprint Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1996] at 441–442.

  8. 8.

    Ibid.

  9. 9.

    Ross, Theorie der Rechtsquellen, supra note 3 at 85. The reference is to Henry S. Maine, Lectures on the Early History of Institutions (7th ed., Murray: London, 1897) Lecture XII, “Sovereignty”, 342–370, at 343.

  10. 10.

    Ibid.

  11. 11.

    Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence, supra note 5 at 88.

  12. 12.

    Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ: Law and Political Theory ed. by Thomas Gilby (London: Cambridge University Press, 2006) at 25 (1a2æ 90–97).

  13. 13.

    Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence, supra note 5 at 90.

  14. 14.

    Mill, Austin on Jurisprudence, supra note 7 at 449.

  15. 15.

    Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence, supra note 5 at 94, his italics.

  16. 16.

    Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind ed. by Baruch Brody (Cambridge, MA: MIT press, 1969) Essay V, Ch. VI, 437; cf. Essay II, Ch. 1, 61 ff.

  17. 17.

    Ibid.

  18. 18.

    Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence, supra note 5 at 91; cf. 98.

  19. 19.

    Ibid.

  20. 20.

    Ibid. at 93.

  21. 21.

    Ross, Theorie der Rechtsquellen, supra note 3 at 89.

  22. 22.

    Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence, supra note 5 at 528–530.

  23. 23.

    Ibid. at 524.

  24. 24.

    Ross, Theorie der Rechtsquellen, supra note 3 at 90.

  25. 25.

    Ibid; cf. at 79. The reference is to Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence, supra note 5 at 220 fn.

  26. 26.

    Robert Moles, “John Austin Reconsidered” (1985) 36 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 193–221, at 213.

  27. 27.

    Karl Bergbohm, Jurisprudenz und Rechtsphilosophie, Bd 1 (Leipzig: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1892) at 13; cf. 398.

  28. 28.

    Ibid. at 549, my translation.

  29. 29.

    Ross, Theorie der Rechtsquellen, supra note 3 at vi; cf. 181.

  30. 30.

    Julius Stone, Legal System and Lawyers’ Reasonings (London: Stevens & Sons, 1964) at 74.

  31. 31.

    William L. Morison, John Austin (London: Edward Arnold, 1982) at 189. For a response, see Stone, Legal System, supra note 30 at 90, cf. 83.

  32. 32.

    Ross, Theorie der Rechtsquellen, supra note 3 at 91.

  33. 33.

    Ibid. at 98; cf. 115.

  34. 34.

    Maine, Lectures, supra note 9 at 370.

  35. 35.

    Austin, Lectures, vol. 2, “On the Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence”, supra note 5 at 1112.

  36. 36.

    Ross, Theorie der Rechtsquellen, supra note 3 at 101.

  37. 37.

    Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions (1919) ed. by Walter W. Cook, with a new foreword by Arthur L. Corbin (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946 reprint 1964).

  38. 38.

    Ross, Theorie der Rechtsquellen, supra note 3 at 76, fn 3.

  39. 39.

    Ibid. at 85.

  40. 40.

    Hans Kelsen, “The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence” (1941–1942) 55 Harvard Law Review 44–70, at 54 ff.

  41. 41.

    See supra note 3.

  42. 42.

    Alf Ross, Om Ret og Retfærdighed (København: Nyt Nordisk Forlag, 1953) Eng. trans. by Margaret Dutton, On Law and Justice (London: Stevens & Sons, 1958) at 1, referring to his Theorie der Rechtsquellen for an account of Austin’s theory, and 8 for the quotation.

  43. 43.

    Alf Ross, “Naturret contra Retspositivisme” [Natural Law v. Legal Positivism] (1963) Tidskrift for Rettsvitenskap 497–525, reprinted in Alf Ross, Ret som teknik kunst og videnskab ed. by Isi Foighel, Hans Gammeltoft-Hansen, Henrik Zahle (København: Jurist- og Økonomforbundets forlag 1999) 228–260, at 239–242.

  44. 44.

    Morris Cohen, “‘Real’ and ‘Ideal’ Forces in Civil Law” (1916) 26 International Journal of Ethics 347–358, at 348.

  45. 45.

    In addition to my article, “Alf Ross” supra note 2, see Patricia Mindus, A Real Mind. The Life and Work of Axel Hägerström (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009).

  46. 46.

    Axel Hägerström, Är gällande rätt uttryck av vilja? (1916) trans. by C.D. Broad, “Is Positive Law an Expression of Will?” in Hägerström, Inquiries into Law and Morals ed. by Karl Olivecrona (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1953) at 17–55. I have modified Broad’s translation.

  47. 47.

    See Bergbohm, Jurisprudenz und Rechtsphilosophie, supra note 7 at 49.

  48. 48.

    Hägerström, Inquiries into Law and Morals, supra note 46 at 17.

  49. 49.

    Ibid. at 18.

  50. 50.

    Ibid.

  51. 51.

    Ibid.

  52. 52.

    Hägerström, Inquiries into Law and Morals, supra note 46 at 28.

  53. 53.

    Ibid. at 29.

  54. 54.

    Ibid. See also Maine, Lectures, Lecture XII “Sovereignty”, supra note 9 at 348; Austin, Lectures, Lecture VI, supra note 5 at 226.

  55. 55.

    Ross, Theorie der Rechtsquellen, supra note 3 at 113 fn 89a.

  56. 56.

    Ibid. at 34.

  57. 57.

    Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence, supra note 5 at 226; cf. 337.

  58. 58.

    Maine, Lectures, Lecture XII, supra note 9 at 349. Maine’s statement is misleading, see John Dewey, “Austin’s Theory of Sovereignty” (1894/1895) 9 Political Science Quarterly 31–52.

  59. 59.

    Thomas Hill Green, “Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation” in Philosophical Works, vol. 2 [first published 1888] (reprint London: The Lawbook Exchange, 2006) at 95, referring to Maine’s account of Austin’s theory in Lectures, see note 32 supra.

  60. 60.

    Hägerström, Inquiries into Law and Morals, supra note 46 at 30, his italics.

  61. 61.

    Ibid. at 35.

  62. 62.

    Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence, supra note 5 at 283.

  63. 63.

    Ibid. at 274.

  64. 64.

    Ibid. at 270. This is false, but I shall not enter into a discussion.

  65. 65.

    Ibid. at 298.

  66. 66.

    Ibid. at 279.

  67. 67.

    Ibid. at 121.

  68. 68.

    Hägerström, Inquiries into Law and Morals, supra note 46 at 37 ff.

  69. 69.

    Ibid. at 39.

  70. 70.

    Herbert L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd ed.) ed. by Penelope A. Bulloch, Joseph Raz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) at 35–42. See also Alf Ross, “Review of H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law” (1962) 71 The Yale Law Journal 1185–1190, 1185; Moles, “John Austin Reconsidered” supra note 26, for the critique according to which Hart misunderstands Austin.

  71. 71.

    Axel Hägerström, “Stat och Statsformer” (1921), now in Rätten och staten. Tre föreläsningar om rätts- och statsfilosofi [The Law and the State. Three Lectures on Philosophy of Law and State] ed. by Martin Fries (Stockholm: Natur & Kultur, 1963) at 119–173.

  72. 72.

    See Vilhelm Lundstedt, “Ausführungen von Hägerström” [Hägerström’s statements] in Die Unwissenschaftlichkeit der Rechtswissenschaft, Bd. 1, Die Falschen Vorstellungen von objektiven und subjektiven Rechten (Berlin: Rothschild, 1932) at 217–231.

  73. 73.

    Axel Hägerström, Selbstdarstellung (1929) transl. Robert T. Sandin as “Summary of My Own Philosophy” in Philosophy and Religion ed. by Robert T. Sandin (London: Allen & Unwin, 1964) at 74.

  74. 74.

    Lundstedt, Die Unwissenschaftlichkeit der Rechtswissenschaft, supra note 72 at 196.

  75. 75.

    Ibid. at 197.

  76. 76.

    Ibid.

  77. 77.

    Lundstedt, Die Unwissenschaftlichkeit der Rechtswissenschaft, supra note 72 at 257; cf. 320.

  78. 78.

    Ibid. at 253.

  79. 79.

    Karl Olivecrona, Law as Fact 1st ed. (London: Humphrey Milford, 1939) Preface. Olivecrona was also instrumental for publication of Hägerström’s articles; see his introduction to Hägerström, Inquiries, supra note 44 at x–xxvii. See also Torben Spaak, “Olivecrona’s Legal Philosophy. A Critical Appraisal” (2011) 24 Ratio Juris 156–193.

  80. 80.

    Olivecrona, Law as Fact 1st ed., supra note 79 at 17.

  81. 81.

    Ibid. at 21.

  82. 82.

    Karl Olivecrona, Law as Fact 2nd ed. (London: Stevens & Sons, 1971) at 40.

  83. 83.

    Ibid. at 45.

  84. 84.

    Jeremy Bentham, A Fragment on Government (1776) in The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham ed. by James H. Burns, Herbert L. A. Hart (London: The Athlone Press, 1977) at 399.

  85. 85.

    Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence, supra note 5 at 121.

  86. 86.

    Olivecrona, Law as Fact 2nd ed., supra note 82 at 125.

  87. 87.

    Olivecrona, Law as Fact 1st ed., supra note 79 at 28, 31; see 2nd ed., supra note 82 at 120–126. Karl Olivecrona, “The Imperative Element in Law” (1964) 18 Rutgers Law Review, 794–810 introduces the distinction between ideational and imperative elements in a command.

  88. 88.

    Olivecrona, Law as Fact 1st ed., supra note 79 at 32.

  89. 89.

    Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence, supra note 5 at 91.

  90. 90.

    Olivecrona, The Imperative Element, supra note 87 at 796.

  91. 91.

    Olivecrona, Law as Fact 1st ed., supra note 79 at 28.

  92. 92.

    Ibid. at 47; cf. 2nd ed., supra note 82 at 127.

  93. 93.

    Olivecrona, Law as Fact 1st ed., supra note 77 at 33.

  94. 94.

    Ibid. at 213.

  95. 95.

    Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence, supra note 5 at 94.

  96. 96.

    Olivecrona, Law as Fact 1st ed., supra note 77 at 213.

  97. 97.

    Ibid. at 133.

  98. 98.

    Olivecrona, Law as Fact 2nd ed., supra note 82 at 124.

  99. 99.

    Ibid. at 125.

  100. 100.

    Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence, supra note 5 at 227.

  101. 101.

    Olivecrona, Law as Fact 1st ed., supra note 79 at 219.

  102. 102.

    Olivecrona, Law as Fact 2nd ed., supra note 82 at 129.

  103. 103.

    Olivecrona, Law as Fact 1st ed., supra note 79 at 43; 2nd ed., supra note 82 at 28.

  104. 104.

    Olivecrona, Law as Fact 1st ed., supra note 79 at 43; 2nd ed., supra note 82 at 130.

  105. 105.

    Olivecrona, Law as Fact 2nd ed., supra note 82 at 82; cf. 124.

  106. 106.

    Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence ed. by Michael D.A. Freeman (7th ed., London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2001) at 208.

  107. 107.

    Olivecrona, Law as Fact 1st ed., supra note 79 at 185; Olivecrona, Law as Fact 2nd ed., supra note 82 at 171. Alf Ross also follows suit endorsing Olivecrona’s theory but instead of using the term “independent imperatives” Ross prefers to use the technical term “directives.”

  108. 108.

    Albert Koucerek, “Review of Heinz Lunau” (1939–1940) 34 Illinois Law Review 637–640, at 638.

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  1. Law School, University of Stockholm, Stockholm, Sweden

    Jes Bjarup

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  1. Law School, UCL, Bentham House, Endsleigh Gardens, London, WC1 0EG, United Kingdom

    Michael Freeman

  2. Engelska parken, Thunbergsv. 3 H, Uppsala, 751 26, Sweden

    Patricia Mindus

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Bjarup, J. (2013). Sense and Nonsense About Austin’s Jurisprudence from a Scandinavian Perspective. In: Freeman, M., Mindus, P. (eds) The Legacy of John Austin's Jurisprudence. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 103. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4830-9_6

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