Advertisement

Law, Liberty and the Rule of Law (in a Constitutional Democracy)

  • Imer B. FloresEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice book series (IUSGENT, volume 18)

Abstract

This chapter considers the relationship between the concepts and conceptions of law and the rule of law. It begins by arguing that the ideal embedded in the concept of the rule of law cannot be logically derived from merely combining the content of the concept rule with the content of the concept law. The rule of law has content that transcends both the atomic concepts of rule and law of which the more complex concept is constructed, as well as the formal assertion that law rules, regardless of its relationship to certain principles, including both negative and positive liberties. In that sense, it reconsiders the relationship not only between the rule of law and concept of freedom by recalling the distinction between two concepts of liberty but also between the rule of law and constitutional democracy. Finally, it concludes by suggesting that the tendency to reduce the democratic principle to the majority rule (or majority principle), i.e. to whatever pleases the majority, as part of the positive liberty, is contrary both to the negative liberty and to the rule of law itself.

Keywords

Majority Rule Difference Principle Constitutional Rule Individual Liberty Majority Principle 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

References

  1. Aristotle. 1988. Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  2. Aristotle. 1999. Nicomachean ethics. Trans. T. Irwin, Indianapolis: Hackett.Google Scholar
  3. Atienza, M. 1989a. Sociología jurídica y ciencia de la legislación. In El derecho y sus realidades. Investigación y enseñanza de la sociología jurídica, ed. R. Bergalli. Barcelona: PPU.Google Scholar
  4. Atienza, M. 1989b. Contribución a la teoría de la legislación. Doxa 6: 385.Google Scholar
  5. Atienza, M. 1990. Para una teoría de la argumentación jurídica. Doxa 8: 39.Google Scholar
  6. Atienza, M. 1997. Contribución a la teoría de la legislación. Madrid: Tecnos.Google Scholar
  7. Austin, J. 1832. The province of jurisprudence determined and the uses of the study of jurisprudence, ed. J. Austin Indianapolis: Hackett.Google Scholar
  8. Berlin, I. 1969. Four essays on liberty, ed. I. Berlin Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  9. Bobbio, N. 1971. Le bon législateur. In Le raisonnment juridique/Legal reasoning/Die jurisdiche argumentation, ed. H. Hubien. Bruxelles: Établissements Émile Bruylant.Google Scholar
  10. Bodenheimer, E. 1962. Jurisprudence. The philosophy and method of the law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  11. Cicero, M.T. 1929. On the commonwealth. Trans. G.H. Sabine and S.B. Smith. Columbus: The Ohio State University Press.Google Scholar
  12. Coke, E. 1607. Prohibitions del Roy. In The selected writings of Sir Edward Coke, vol. I, ed. S. Sheppard. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.Google Scholar
  13. Coke, E. 1608. Calvin’s case, or the case of the postnati. In The selected writings of Sir Edward Coke, vol. I, ed. S. Sheppard. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.Google Scholar
  14. Confucius (2002), Analects. Trans. James Legge. Available at Project Gutenberg Etext, The Chinese Classics (Confucian Analects).Google Scholar
  15. Constant, B. 1820. Collection complète des ouvrages. París: Béchet Libraire.Google Scholar
  16. Dworkin, R. 1978. Taking rights seriously, 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  17. Dworkin, R. 1985. A matter of principle. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  18. Dworkin, R. 1986. Law’s empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  19. Dworkin, Ronald. 1996. Freedom’s law. The moral reading of the American constitution. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  20. Dworkin, Ronald. 2000. Sovereign virtue. The theory and practice of equality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  21. Dworkin, R. 2006. Is democracy possible here? Principles for a new political debate. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  22. Dworkin, R. 2011. Justice for hedgehogs. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  23. Flores, I.B. 2002. In the dark side of the conventionality thesis? In Studies in social, political and legal philosophy. Philosophy of law and of politics, ed. E. Villanueva. Amsterdam: Rodopi.Google Scholar
  24. Flores, I.B. 2004. Assessing democracy and rule of law: Access to justice. In Proceedings of the 21st IVR world congress, Lund (Sweden), 12–17 August, 2003, Part I: Justice, ed. A. Peczenik. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag.Google Scholar
  25. Flores, I.B. 2005. The quest for legisprudence: Constitutionalism v. Legalism. In The theory and practice of legislation: Essays on legisprudence, ed. L.J. Wintgens. Aldershot: Ashgate.Google Scholar
  26. Flores, I.B. 2007. Legisprudence: The forms and limits of legislation. Problema. Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho 1: 247.Google Scholar
  27. Flores, I.B. 2008. The living tree: Fixity and flexibility. A general theory of (judicial review in a) constitutional democracy? Problema. Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho 2: 285.Google Scholar
  28. Flores, I.B. 2009a. The living tree constitutionalism: Fixity and flexibility. Problema. Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho 3: 37.Google Scholar
  29. Flores, I.B. 2009b. Legisprudence: The role and rationality of legislators – vis-à-vis judges – towards the realization of justice. Mexican Law Review 1(2): 91.Google Scholar
  30. Flores, I.B. 2010. Ronald Dworkin’s Justice for hedgehogs and partnership conception of democracy (with a comment to Jeremy Waldron’s “A majority in the lifeboat”). Problema. Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho 4: 65.Google Scholar
  31. Fuller, L.L. 1958. Positivism and fidelity to law –A reply to professor Hart. Harvard Law Review 71: 630.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  32. Fuller, L.L. 1968. The anatomy of law. New York: Frederick A. Praeger.Google Scholar
  33. Fuller, L.L. 1969. The morality of law, 2nd ed. New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
  34. Fuller, L.L. 1999. The case of the speluncean explorers. Harvard Law Review 112: 1851.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  35. Guinier, L. 1994. The tyranny of the majority. Fundamental fairness in representative democracy. New York: The Free Press.Google Scholar
  36. Hamilton, A. 1985. Speech, June 18, 1787. In Selected writings and speeches of Alexander Hamilton, ed. M.J. Frisch. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute.Google Scholar
  37. Hart, H.L.A. 1958. Positivism and the separation of law and morals. Harvard Law Review 71: 593.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  38. Hart, H.L.A. 1961. The concept of law. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  39. Hart, H.L.A. 1994. The concept of law, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  40. Hayek, F.A. 1960. The constitution of liberty. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
  41. Holmes, O.W. 1917. Southern Pacific v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205.Google Scholar
  42. Kelsen, H. 1945. General theory of law and state. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  43. Kelsen, H. 1967. Pure theory of law, 2nd ed. Trans. M. Knight, Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar
  44. Kelsen, H. 2002. Introduction to the problems of legal theory. Trans. B. Litschewski-Paulson and S.L. Paulson. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  45. Lincoln, A. 1990. New birth of freedom. The Gettysburg address, November 19, 1863. In Lincoln on democracy, ed. M.M. Cuomo and H. Holzer. New York: Harper Collins.Google Scholar
  46. MacCormick, N. 1999. Questioning sovereignty: Law, state and nation in the European commonwealth. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  47. MacCormick, N. 2007. Institutions of law. An essay in legal theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  48. Madison, J. 1961. No. 51. In The federalist papers, ed. C. Rossiter. New York: Mentor.Google Scholar
  49. Mansfield, W.M. 1770. R v. Wilkes, 4 Burr 2527 [98 ER 327].Google Scholar
  50. Marshall, J. 1824. Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. 738.Google Scholar
  51. Mill, J.S. 1958. Considerations on representative government. Indianapolis: Liberal Arts Press.Google Scholar
  52. Mill, J.S. 1989. On liberty. In On liberty and other writings, ed. S. Collini. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  53. Rawls, J. 1971. A theory of justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  54. Scalia, A. 1989. The rule of law as a law of rules. University of Chicago Law Review 56: 1187.Google Scholar
  55. Sen, A. 1992. Inequality reexamined. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  56. Tocqueville, A. 1969. Democracy in America. New York: Anchor Books.Google Scholar
  57. Waldron, J. 2002. Large legislatures. In Legal and political philosophy. Philosophy of law and of politics, ed. E. Villanueva. Amsterdam: Rodopi.Google Scholar
  58. Waldron, J. 2008. The concept and the rule of law. Georgia Law Review 43: 1.Google Scholar
  59. Waluchow, W.J. 2007. A common law theory of judicial review. The living tree. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht. 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Law School and Legal Research InstituteNational Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM)Mexico CityMexico

Personalised recommendations