Retroactive Application of Laws and the Rule of Law

  • Juan Vega GómezEmail author
Part of the Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice book series (IUSGENT, volume 18)


This chapter makes one main claim: issues of retroactivity have to be dealt with in a two stage process, one dealing with a formal test of retroactivity and a second one that involves issues of justification. The reason for this is that when analyzing problems of retroactive application of laws, confusion is prone to occur when these sorts of problems are concentrated entirely on issues of justification, i.e. when dealing with these sorts of issues we tend to go directly into a justification process, so the idea is that a clearer understanding of the problem of retroactivity might be advanced and more analytical headway can be obtained if the problem is seen divided in these two stages.


Legal System Formal Test Formal Conception Main Claim Justification Process 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht. 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Legal Research InstituteNational Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM)Mexico CityMexico

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