Introduction

Abstract

Revising the problems of the concept of the “rule of law” and its relationship to both law and liberty are the main aims of this volume. In fact, the concept of rule of law, like the concept of legitimacy, is a morally normative concept that expresses an ideal to which society and its governing institutions should, as a matter of political morality, aspire. For example, the notion of legitimacy applies to those governing institutions that are morally justified in coercively regulating the behaviour of citizens. For a state to be legitimate, as it has sometimes been put, is for the state to have a moral right to rule. Otherwise put, a legitimate state is morally justified not only in enacting restrictions or requirements pertaining to the behaviour of citizens (at least within the scope of its legitimacy), but also – and more importantly – utilizing the coercive enforcement mechanisms to increase compliance that might not be a conceptual feature of law but is a feature of every known modern municipal legal system.