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Obvious Answers for Ready-Made Objections

  • María José Frápolli
Chapter
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Part of the Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science book series (LEUS, volume 29)

Abstract

Once our approach has been disclosed and its theoretical background explained, it is time to reply to the standard criticisms that have been levelled at theories similar to ours (pro-sentential theories and also “minimalist” and “deflationist” views) and that will certainly target our theory as well. This task will be undertaken in the next three sections. Afterwards, it will be explained how our proposal rejects the alleged ambiguity of truth: when an agent attributes truth to a content he is performing the same kind of acts in every context, be it in physics, metaphysics, mathematics, ethics, etc. We will also defend that there are not different kinds of truth: necessary and contingent, analytic and synthetic, formal and material. There are, at most, different kinds of contents but the notion of truth is univocal all the way through.

Keywords

Singular Term Propositional Content Ontological Commitment Propositional Variable Ethical Content 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • María José Frápolli
    • 1
  1. 1.PhilosophyUniversity of GranadaGranadaSpain

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