What Do You Mean by “Redundancy”?

  • María José Frápolli
Part of the Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science book series (LEUS, volume 29)


When the name of Frank Ramsey is pronounced, one of the (few) things that come to everybody’s mind is the theory of truth as redundancy. In this section, we will argue that Ramsey never supported such a theory, but rather an analysis of truth noticeably similar to the prosentential account we are defending.


Singular Term Propositional Content Propositional Variable Truth Predicate Expressive Character 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • María José Frápolli
    • 1
  1. 1.PhilosophyUniversity of GranadaGranadaSpain

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