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What Do We Do with Truth Ascriptions?

  • María José Frápolli
Chapter
Part of the Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science book series (LEUS, volume 29)

Abstract

The semantics of truth-ascriptions has been dealt with in  Chap. 3. The following pages will cover their pragmatics. The relative boundaries between pragmatics and semantics, as academic disciplines, are blurry to the extent that the question of their delimitation has turned out to be one of the most pressing tasks in contemporary philosophy of language. Demarcation issues are a tradition in Analytic Philosophy. Examples include discussions about the limits of science, due to philosophers of science at the beginning of twentieth century (see, for instance, Popper 1935/1959, and Hempel 1950), and also the discussions about the scope of syntax and semantics (see Carnap 1939, 1942 and also Chomsky 1965). Although the divide between semantics and pragmatics seems to be theoretically straightforward, difficulties arise as soon as one goes into detail and has to delimit the notions involved.

Keywords

Propositional Content Propositional Variable General Sentence Expressive Meaning Conventional Implicature 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • María José Frápolli
    • 1
  1. 1.PhilosophyUniversity of GranadaGranadaSpain

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