The Meaning and Content of Truth Ascriptions

  • María José Frápolli
Part of the Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science book series (LEUS, volume 29)


The semantics of the expressions in which truth shows its usefulness is not straightforward, and its complexity partially explains the multiplicity of accounts available in the bibliography. The functioning of truth ascriptions cannot be explained and understood without having at hand a theory of meaning that makes room for different aspects of the notion, as for instance those aspects represented in the distinction between an expression’s linguistic meaning and the semantic values that the expression embodies when used in a particular context. Truth ascriptions work in language as variables of some kind. Understanding variables is understanding indexicality. The job performed by variables/indexicals requires a contrast between some relatively stable aspects of meaning, on the one hand, and aspects more exposed to the influence of context, on the other. The philosophy of language of the past century has incorporated this distinction under different guises, but any of them suffices for accepting the proposal on the semantics of truth ascriptions explained in this chapter.


Singular Term Definite Description Propositional Variable Grammatical Category Truth Predicate 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • María José Frápolli
    • 1
  1. 1.PhilosophyUniversity of GranadaGranadaSpain

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