Syntax: Playing with Building Blocks

  • María José Frápolli
Part of the Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science book series (LEUS, volume 29)


What does syntax teach us about language? As a discipline, syntax studies the rules that govern the well-formedness of the complexes of words, or in general the well-formedness of strings of signs. Regardless of whether one considers the syntax of natural languages as a representation of the configuration of the human brain or as an abstract formal theory, syntax as a discipline proposes a particular model or mechanism, a structure combined with a set of rules, that, applied to a suitable basic set of expressions or items, produces (or should be able to produce) all the sentences and complex expressions that constitute a given language.


Identity Theory Singular Term Propositional Content Definite Description Truth Predicate 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • María José Frápolli
    • 1
  1. 1.PhilosophyUniversity of GranadaGranadaSpain

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