Some Preliminary Issues

  • María José Frápolli
Part of the Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science book series (LEUS, volume 29)


What kind of semantic enigma hides in the following toy-conversation?The answer to this question, which we will disclose throughout this book, is straightforward: none. There is no intractable feature in the functioning of truth expressions in natural languages, although the notion truth is complex enough as to require a highly sophisticated conceptual apparatus. The general purpose of this book is to dispel the air of mystery that has traditionally accompanied the notion and doing it with the aid of the conceptual tools put at our disposal by the contemporary sciences of language.


Natural Language Propositional Content Truth Operator Propositional Variable Truth Predicate 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • María José Frápolli
    • 1
  1. 1.PhilosophyUniversity of GranadaGranadaSpain

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