An Approach to Human-Level Commonsense Reasoning

  • Michael L. Anderson
  • Walid Gomaa
  • John Grant
  • Don Perlis
Part of the Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science book series (LEUS, volume 26)


Commonsense reasoning has proven exceedingly difficult both to model and to implement in artificial reasoning systems. This paper discusses some of the features of human reasoning that may account for this difficulty, surveys a number of reasoning systems and formalisms, and offers an outline of active logic, a non-classical paraconsistent logic that may be of some use in implementing commonsense reasoning.


Active Logic Semantic Network Inference Engine Declarative Memory Human Reasoning 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.



We would like to thank the referees for many helpful comments and suggestions.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht. 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michael L. Anderson
    • 1
    • 2
  • Walid Gomaa
    • 3
    • 4
  • John Grant
    • 1
    • 5
    • 6
  • Don Perlis
    • 1
    • 5
  1. 1.Institute for Advanced Computer StudiesUniversity of MarylandCollege ParkUSA
  2. 2.Department of PsychologyFranklin and Marshall CollegeLancasterUSA
  3. 3.Department of Computer and Systems EngineeringAlexandria UniversityAlexandriaEgypt
  4. 4.Department of Computer Science and EngineeringEgypt-Japan University of Science and TechnologyNew Borg El-Arab City, AlexandriaEgypt
  5. 5.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of MarylandCollege ParkUSA
  6. 6.Department of MathematicsTowson UniversityTowsonUSA

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