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Open Problems

  • Francesco Berto
Chapter
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 356)

Abstract

Our modal Meinongian theory faces difficulties and open questions too. Being so recent a theory, its critical discussion is still in its infancy. This Chapter is devoted to problems that have surfaced, proposing in broad outline strategies to address them. The discussion will at times prove to be inconclusive, however. I hope to do better when, and if, I find the time to write an Existence As a Real Property, Part II. The main aim of this Chapter is indeed explorative: it helps to locate the immediate troubles of a new research program (and I do find modal Meinongianism quite innovative in the landscape of non-Parmenidean ontologies); and suggests possible ways to protect its core ideas.

Keywords

Actual World Abstract Object Causal Power Fictional Character Concrete Object 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Francesco Berto
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Philosophy and Northern Institute of PhilosophyUniversity of AberdeenAberdeenUK

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