Nonexistents of the Third Kind at Work
Two Chapters ago we met modal Meinongianism for the first time, and in the previous Chapter we have seen the theory formally developed via the tools of world semantics. It is now time to put the nonexistents of the third kind at work. To begin with, we will look at the modal Meinongian answers to the problems affecting naïve Meinongianism. We shall then examine a paradigmatic application of the theory: its treatment of the ontology and semantics of fictional discourse.
KeywordsActual World Fictional Character Previous Chapter Impossible World Identity Criterion
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