Abstract
I argue that considerations about the nature of probability and explanation imply that some differences about how to understand the apparent fact that the universe is “fine-tuned” in various respects are unresolvable within the bounds of any discussion that is limited to the facts at issue and the nature of the proper way to reason from those facts.
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Notes
- 1.
No attempt is made, here, at bibliographic completeness. The literature is too large. The interested reader will get a good start by following the references in the works cited throughout this chapter. A classic work examining some of the physical theory mentioned here is Barrow and Tipler (1986). Cf. Barrow (2003).
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- 3.
- 4.
Pr(E | H) is the usual meaning of ‘likelihood’ in this context, and must be what is meant in FT4′, as opposed to Pr(H | E), because claiming that Pr(H | E) is higher for H = design than for H = chance would beg the question. For a discussion of likelihood in the context of design arguments, see Sober (2005).
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- 7.
The resulting position is not entirely relativist. Given a sample space and a mode of description, there is (or at any rate, may be) a correct answer to the question “What is the probability of E?”. However, it is relativist in the sense that there is no absolute answer to the question “What is the probability of E?”; or rather, I prefer to say that this question is incomplete, as it fails to specify a sample space and mode of description.
- 8.
It is far from clear what these physical facts have to do with the notion that a “low”-probability event needs explanation, but I will set that point aside.
- 9.
That is, it can be expressed as a relation on the set of cards with the proper mathematical properties (one that is reflexive, antisymmetric, transitive, and total).
- 10.
Assume, for the discussion, that there is no causal-mechanical explanation of the EPR-Bohm correlations.
- 11.
See the previous footnote.
- 12.
There is, of course, the additional consideration of the cost of bringing E about.
- 13.
The use of temporal terminology to describe a God who is, by traditional accounts, “outside” of time (whatever we mean by that locution) is inherently problematic, of course, and raises additional serious obstacles to the application of normal reasoning about i-explanations to this context.
- 14.
The amount of hedging in this paragraph should make it clear that I am skeptical that many of the notions invoked here even make sense.
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Dickson, M. (2012). What the Fine-Tuning Argument Shows (and Doesn’t Show). In: Swan, L., Gordon, R., Seckbach, J. (eds) Origin(s) of Design in Nature. Cellular Origin, Life in Extreme Habitats and Astrobiology, vol 23. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4156-0_35
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