Abstract
Commendable in Habermas is his explicit acknowledgment of the philosophical relevance of the process of experimentation in the natural sciences. In the philosophy of science, this experimental process is generally treated quite superficially, if it is discussed at all. Following Habermas, experimentation will also play a major role in the philosophical discussion of the next chapter. But before I can start with this we need a more accurate analysis (than Habermas provides) of experiment and experimentation in the natural sciences. I will give this analysis in the present chapter. In doing so, I distinguish three aspects: the theoretical-scientific description of experiments (Sect. 3.2); experimentation as action and materialization (Sect. 3.3); and the challenge the productive aspect of experimentation poses to realist interpretations of experimental science (Sect. 3.4).
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Notes
- 1.
Note that this expression is somewhat elliptical. In fact, p, p 1 , etc. always represent theoretical descriptions of experimental episodes, that is, propositions. For reasons of readability, I shall also speak of p and p 1 as “episodes” (except for cases in which this might lead to misunderstanding).
- 2.
The concept of “reproducibility” will play a major role in my account of scientific experimentation. The present discussion is still rather sketchy. In what follows, I shall examine it on various occasions in more detail.
- 3.
I therefore share Habermas’s view on this issue (see the last but one quotation in Sect. 1.4.1).
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
“Reasonably”, for we can never be absolutely sure whether a 0 would not, of itself, have changed into a. We assume this as reasonable on the basis of earlier experiences. Von Wright argues that this “counterfactual” aspect (that certain things would not happen unless we do them and that other things would occur unless we prevent them) is an essential feature of the concept of human action.
- 8.
- 9.
See also the distinction between isolated and closed systems in Prigogine and Stengers (1980, 134).
- 10.
As the following example shows, these conditions may also be necessary for the experimental result itself, and not only, as Von Wright (1971, 63) states, for the carrying out of the experiment.
- 11.
I do want to add that the essence of my criticism is not so much that necessary conditions should be included in addition to sufficient conditions. After all, Von Wright might accommodate this point by a slight (formal) modification of his definition of closedness. The main point of concern is that, generally speaking, not only the occurrence of the initial state requires active human intervention, but that this also holds true for the intermediate states and for the final state. Hence, an important objective of the entire analysis is to establish the exact meaning of the phrase that “in closed systems not only p, but also q has to be artificially produced”.
- 12.
This means: sufficiently general within the context of this study. In other contexts, particularly those in which the social aspects of producing closed systems are prominent, we should also include the impact of the system on its surroundings. For this extension, see Radder (1986).
- 13.
This implies developing an idea introduced in Radder (1978, 38–42).
- 14.
Note that I use this example of Newtonian and Einsteinian mass, here and in the next chapter, only to indicate the philosophical problem (see also Kuhn 1970a, 101–102; Field 1973, 463–473). A much more detailed example will be provided in Chap. 5, in which I discuss the relation between the classical physical theories and quantum mechanics.
- 15.
This study has been described quite extensively in Lynch et al. (1983, especially 225–229).
- 16.
Compare also the distinction Harry Collins introduces between the “algorithmic” and the “enculturational” model for the replication of experiments (Collins 1975, 206–208).
- 17.
- 18.
See also Van Lieshout and Mol (1982, especially 30–61). They regard science as a constellation of “talk” (the verbal, the theoretical), “things” (the material) and “activities” (the social), in which these aspects are not hierarchically related but mutually structure each other. A striking example of ignoring the material dimension can be found in De Vries (1982). In his review of the book Laboratory Life, he leaves out completely the notion of materialization to which Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar attach so much importance, and restricts himself to discussing their concept of “credibility”.
- 19.
At least, in our modern culture. In Sect. 4.4, I will return to this important point.
- 20.
- 21.
Bhaskar (1982), 343. Thus, Bhaskar’s second argument implies a criticism of Habermas’s viewpoint with respect to technological application. While for Habermas a technology constitutes an extension of an experiment (as an “anticipated technology”), Bhaskar claims that there is a fundamental difference: in contrast with experimentation, technology generally takes place in basically open systems, where various contrary kinds of mechanisms operate simultaneously. It would carry us too far to subject this important disagreement between Habermas and Bhaskar to a closer examination, though I will briefly return to it in the Conclusion. For more on this subject, see Radder (1986).
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Radder, H. (2012). Experimentation in the Natural Sciences. In: The Material Realization of Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 294. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4107-2_3
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