Post-Fregean Thoughts on Propositional Unity

  • Bjørn Jespersen
Part of the Studies in History and Philosophy of Science book series (AUST, volume 28)


This note sketches how a theory of procedural semantics may offer a solution to the problem of the unity of the proposition. The current revival of the notion of structured meaning has made the problem of propositional unity pressing. The problem, stated in its simplest form, is how an individual a and a property F combine into the proposition P that a is an F; i.e. how two different kinds of objects combine into a third kind of object capable of having properties that neither of its constituents could have. Constraints imposed on P include that P must be capable of being true/false, being known/believed to be true/false, and occurring as argument of propositional connectives, such as entailment.


Atomic Proposition Functional Application Structure Proposition Russellian Proposition Procedural Semantic 
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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy, Institute of LogicCzech Academy of SciencesPragueCzech Republic
  2. 2.Department of Computer ScienceVŠB-Technical University of OstravaOstravaCzech Republic

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