A Neglected Reply to Prior’s Dilemma
This paper offers a novel reply to Prior’s dilemma (for the Is/Ought principle), advocating a so-called Weak Kleene framework motivated by two not uncommon thoughts in the debate, namely, that ought statements are identified as those that use ‘ought’, and that ought statements are ‘funny’ in ways that is statements aren’t (e.g., perhaps sometimes being ‘gappy’ with respect to truth and falsity).
KeywordsEthical Discourse Valid Argument Boolean Operator Atomic Sentence Logical Behaviour
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