Against Advanced Modalizing

Chapter
Part of the Studies in History and Philosophy of Science book series (AUST, volume 28)

Abstract

I discuss a problem for modal realism raised by John Divers and others. I argue that the problem is real enough but that Divers’ “advanced modalising” solution is inadequate. The problem can only be solved by (1) holding that modal realism is only contingently true, (2) embracing a kind of Meinongianism about ontological commitment, or (3) abandoning the project of “analysing modality”.

Keywords

Modal Logic Ordinary Language Modal Realist Modal Language Distribution Rule 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Corpus Christi CollegeOxford UniversityOxfordUK

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