Abstract
In this chapter I outline a dilemma. If we resist human/nature dualism by thinking of human beings as embodied and environmentally situated – as natural – then this seems to imply that, as human products, modern environmentally damaging cultures are after all natural. However, claiming that these cultures are alienated from nature seems to return us to belief in human separateness. I explore a solution to this dilemma found in the work of Friedrich Hölderlin. He suggests that nature has divided itself into human subjects and the particular, finite, natural objects of which we are conscious and from which we feel separate. Thus both humanity and natural environments are aspects of nature in an expanded sense, as a self-dividing whole.
For Hölderlin, then, human estrangement from nature – and by extension contemporary environmental crisis – is a product of nature itself. This has the seemingly unhelpful implication that we human beings neither can nor should attempt to prevent this crisis. However, I argue that this quietism is less unhelpful than it might seem. It is motivated by anti-anthropocentrism; it anticipates Heidegger’s scepticism about seeking a technological fix; and it allows for a novel justification of environmentalist practices as ways of preparing for possible change in nature’s way of being.
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Notes
- 1.
Classifying Hölderlin as ‘Romantic’ is somewhat controversial. Dieter Henrich claims that Hölderlin was not a Romantic because he did not subscribe to the Romantic theory of fragmentary, ironic literature, but instead ‘advocated perfection in the formal composition of poems’ (Henrich 2003: 227). However, I treat Hölderlin as a Romantic in the broader sense that he subscribes to an organic metaphysics, as did most other Early German Romantics.
- 2.
Holderlin does not state his reasoning as explicitly as this. I am indebted to the reconstruction provided by Henrich (1997). Frederick Beiser also reconstructs the argument (without specific reference to Hölderlin, although he attributes it to those he calls the ‘absolute idealists’ – Friedrich Schlegel, Novalis, Schelling – amongst whom he numbers Hölderlin) as follows: ‘the very concept of subjectivity makes sense only in contrast to objectivity, a contrast that … works only within experience’ (Beiser 2002: 152).
- 3.
Confusingly, however, Hölderlin calls the natural ‘aorgic’ and the artificial ‘organic’ (see below).
- 4.
- 5.
For discussion of these views, see Nassar (2011).
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Stone, A. (2012). Hölderlin and Human-Nature Relations. In: Brady, E., Phemister, P. (eds) Human-Environment Relations. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2825-7_5
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