Correlations and Counterfactuals: The EPR Illusion

  • Allen Stairs
Part of the The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science book series (WONS, volume 78)


I argue that ever since Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen’s original paper, our thinking about quantum correlations has been dogged by a persistent illusion: we fall into the trap of taking measurements on one half of an EPR pair to license counterfactual inferences about the other member of the pair. In this essay I attempt to diagnose this illusion and make it less tempting.


Entangle Pair State Attribution Objective Chance Causal Past Future Light Cone 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of MarylandCollege ParkUSA

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