Quantum Mechanics and Ontology
This chapter considers the prospects, in the present state of research in quantum mechanics, for an ontological foundation for the theory that is compatible with the minimal constraints of scientific realism, that is, compatible with the attribution of physical states to particles. No single interpretation is defended, but it is argued that no-collapse theories such as the various “many-worlds” interpretations cannot coherently satisfy such constraints, while objective collapse theories such as the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber (GRW) theory offer the possibility, at least, of satisfying both these conceptual constraints and the empirical constraints of quantum phenomena.
KeywordsWave Function Quantum Mechanic Ontological Commitment Bohmian Mechanic Standard Quantum Mechanic
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